The impact of the national council of provinces on legislation by Mafilika, Vuyokazi Abegail
  
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF PROVINCES 
 ON LEGISLATION  
 
 
 
VUYOKAZI ABEGAIL MAFILIKA 
 
 
 
A mini-thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Law 
 
 
 
Supervisor:  Prof. Nicolaas Steytler  
  
 
 
 
November  2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 DECLARATION 
 
I hereby declare that this is my own work. It is submitted for the Degree of Master of 
Philosophy in Law in the Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape. I further 
testify that it has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination to any other 
university or institution of higher learning, and that all sources that I have used or quoted 
have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references. 
 
Signature: ______________________________________________ 
Vuyokazi A Mafilika 
 
Dated this ________day of November 2013 
 
 
Signature: ______________________________________________ 
Prof. Nicholaas Steytler 
 
Dated this ________day of November 2013 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
DEDICATION 
 
This study is dedicated to all the young women who are doing post graduate studies on a 
part-time basis. Working full time and studying is both physically and emotionally 
challenging. This study is also meant to inspire and motivate the young people of Langa 
Township, in Cape Town, because you too can achieve this goal. Seize the opportunity and 
make your contribution to the academic space.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to the following individuals who played a supporting 
role in the completion of this paper.  
 
• My Supervisor, Professor, Nicolaas Steytler. Thank you for your patience, guidance 
and encouragement.  
• My mentor, Dr. Zemelak Ayele.  You were truly God sent. Thank you for your 
guidance, support, perseverance and encouragement.  
• My family: parents (Tanci and Ncinci), brothers and cousins, for your support and 
motivation. You are the reason I wrote this paper. Thabile, I hope one day you will 
follow suit.  
• To my friends:  thank you Thembani for your support and suggestions on my paper, 
and for listening when times were tough. To a special friend Thato, thank you for 
journeying with me every step of the way. Even when I felt like giving up you were 
there to remind me why I started this journey.  
• To my colleagues:  thank you for your patience, and advice on the processes of 
parliament. Thank you for listening and being a sounding board.  
• To the friendly staff of the Community Law Centre:  Thank you for making those 
appointments with the Prof less stressful. Your warm welcome always made my visit 
a joy.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACRONYMS 
 
ANC  African National congress 
CLaRA Communal Land Rights Act 
DA  Democratic Alliance 
DRB  Division of Revenue Bill 
COGTA Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
IFP  Inkatha Freedom Party 
IRG  Intergovernmental Relations 
JTM  Joint Tagging Mechanism 
NA  National Assembly 
NCOP  National Council of Provinces 
NP  National Party 
UWC  University of the Western Cape 
 
  
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Cabinet The Cabinet of South Africa.  (Senior executive consisting of the 
President, the Deputy President, the Ministers, and the Deputy 
Ministers.) 
Constitution The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 
1996) 
Executive A member of National Cabinet, i.e a Minister 
Interim Constitution The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 
1993) 
Money bills Bills that seek to appropriate money, impost tax, levies or surcharges, 
etc. 
National Assembly National Assembly of South Africa 
 
Parliament Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 
 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
A website with verbatim minutes, reports and status of bills of 
parliamentary proceedings, including portfolio committee meetings of 
parliament 
president The president of the Republic of South Africa 
 
provinces the provinces of South Africa  
 
Third Parliament Third Parliamentary session since democracy; covers the period from 
2004to 2009 
 
Tagging A process followed by Parliament for classifying bills.  It determines the 
scope and depth of amendments that the NCOP may follow in passing 
bills. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION ..................................................................................................................................... i 
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................................................ ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................... iii 
ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................................................... iv 
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................................ v 
CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................................... vi 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................... xi 
CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 
1. PROBLEM STATEMENT ........................................................................................................ 1 
2. RESEARCH QUESTION .......................................................................................................... 4 
3. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ............................................................... 4 
4. SCOPE OF THE STUDY .......................................................................................................... 5 
5. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................. 6 
6. LITERATURE REVIEW........................................................................................................... 6 
7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................... 8 
8. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY ..................................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER TWO: COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NCOP ......................................... 10 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 10 
2. HISTORY OF THE NCOP ...................................................................................................... 10 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
3. COMPOSITION OF THE NCOP ............................................................................................ 12 
4. FUNCTIONS OF THE NCOP ................................................................................................. 15 
5. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 16 
CHAPTER THREE: THE NCOP FRAMEWORK FOR PROCESSING BILLS ................................ 17 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 17 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK .................................................................................... 17 
3. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS OF THE NCOP ........................................................................... 18 
3.1 Bills amending the Constitution ............................................................................................... 18 
3.1.1 The nature of bills amending the Constitution ......................................................................... 18 
3.1.2 The procedure for bills amending the Constitution .................................................................. 20 
3.2 Ordinary bills not affecting provinces ...................................................................................... 21 
3.3 Ordinary bills affecting provinces ............................................................................................ 22 
3.3.1 Nature of the bill ...................................................................................................................... 22 
3.3.2 Procedure followed for section 76 bills ................................................................................... 23 
3.3.3 Legislative cycle ...................................................................................................................... 23 
3.3.4 Section 76 procedures for bills introduced in the NA .............................................................. 25 
3.3.5 Section 76 procedures for bills introduced in the NCOP ......................................................... 26 
3.4 Mixed bills ............................................................................................................................... 27 
3.5 Money bills .............................................................................................................................. 28 
4. TAGGING BILLS ................................................................................................................... 28 
4.1 Tests for tagging ....................................................................................................................... 29 
4.2 Tagging process ....................................................................................................................... 29 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
5. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 31 
CHAPTER FOUR: ASSESSMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY BY THE NCOP ............. 32 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 32 
2. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................... 32 
3. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 33 
4. BILLS PROCESSED BY PARLIAMENT FROM 2004 TO 2009 ......................................... 34 
4.1 Quantity and nature of bills ...................................................................................................... 34 
4.2 Bills amending the Constitution ............................................................................................... 37 
4.3 Ordinary bills not affecting provinces ...................................................................................... 39 
4.4 Ordinary bills not affecting provinces ...................................................................................... 44 
4.5 Amending mixed bills .............................................................................................................. 50 
4.6 Amending money bills ............................................................................................................. 51 
4.7 Bills not passed ........................................................................................................................ 52 
4.8 Quality of the NCOP’s amendments ........................................................................................ 53 
5. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 55 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 57 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 57 
2. SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTERS .................................................................... 58 
3. FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................... 61 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................... 63 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................. 66 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The paper focuses on the role of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) in the national 
legislative process. An enquiry into the relevance of the NCOP when processing bills during 
the Third Parliament has been critical when reviewing this role. The paper studied all the 
bills processed by Parliament with particular interest in the amendments proposed by the 
NCOP.  The legislative framework in which the NCOP functions was critical to determine 
whether it enables this institution to adequately fulfill this role.  
The objective of this paper was to assess whether or not the NCOP fulfills its constitutional 
role of representing provincial interests in the national legislative process. The paper has 
uncovered the following regarding the NCOP’s role in the national legislative process.  
• The NCOP role varies according to the different pieces of legislation it is 
considering. This means that the manner in which it processes and passes ordinary 
bills affecting provinces will be different from the way it considers those bills not 
affecting provinces.  
• The NCOP has thorough consultative process on bills affecting provinces, compared 
to the superficial role it plays on bills not affecting provinces. More ordinary bills not 
affecting provinces have been processed by Parliament; however, the NCOP has 
proposed more amendments to the minority of bills affecting provinces.  
• The electoral system of South Africa has weakened the caliber of delegates in the 
NCOP. This has unintended consequences on the strength of the NCOP as an 
institution to abide by its decisions or to challenge the National Assembly when there 
are disagreements.  
• The NCOP may be misguided about its role at times and not strategically situated to 
focus on matters of provincial competence.  
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The paper argues that the NCOP remains relevant and has achieved its constitutional 
mandate of representing the interests of provinces. However, more work needs to be done to 
ascertain a common view of what constitutes provincial interests. Furthermore, the NCOP 
should confine its scope to matters of provincial competence. Thus the small number of 
delegates will be focused on the issues that reflect the core mandate of this institution.  
 
Keywords  
Amendments, constitution, cooperative government, legislation, NCOP, parliament, 
provinces, provincial interests, quality, tagging. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) has a constitutional mandate to represent 
provinces in Parliament. It thus acts as a forum through which provincial interests are raised 
and debated at national level.1The relevance of the NCOP, including the role played by the 
provincial legislatures in the national legislative forum, has featured prominently in public 
debates. Some people emphasise the relevance of the NCOP and provincial legislatures while 
others hold contrasting views. The NCOP has faced both criticisms and acclamations from 
different political players and academics regarding the value that it has added thus far. 
 
Underlining the relevance of the NCOP, the Chairperson of the NCOP, Johannes Mahlangu, 
stated, in his speech at the inaugural lecture of the NCOP in February 2013, hosted by the 
University of the Western Cape (UWC), that the NCOP has closely examined legislation 
forwarded to its committees. To support his claim, the chairperson raised the Protection of 
State Information Bill as an example of a bill to which the NCOP had supposedly made 
numerous technical and substantial amendments.2Mahlangu further indicated that in 2012, the 
NCOP proposed important amendments to the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. He also noted that there is room for improvement in the 
processing of section 76 legislation.3 This is more pertinent in the Division of Revenue Bill, a 
section 76 bill, because of its impact on provinces.4 Clearly, the chairperson is of the opinion 
                                                           
1Section 42 (4) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). 
2Mahlangu J Address by the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, on the 
occasion of the inaugural lecture of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) (2013). 
3Ordinary Bills affecting provinces that follow the procedure set out in section 76 of the 
Constitution.  See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion.  
4Mahlangu J (2013). 
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that the NCOP has made notable contributions to the legislative process. The chairperson in 
his speech not only commends the NCOP but also recognises its value and impact in the 
national legislative process. 
 
Similarly, at the 2009 NCOP conference, Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe expressed 
confidence in the capacity of the NCOP to exercise oversight and to serve as an institution of 
interaction between national government and the provinces.5 Motlante also pointed out that 
the NCOP had to face up to its challenges and move towards outcomes based oversight. 
Improvements have been noted although more initiatives are required to ensure that optimal 
success is achieved by the NCOP.6 
 
Some ten years earlier in 1998, the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki was also very 
supportive of the legislative role of the NCOP, even though he admitted that the institution 
faced a number of challenges that were inhibiting the proper execution of its mandate.7 
Mbeki also pointed out that the NCOP had existed for only a short period of time (since the 
NCOP was then only one year old) and this affected its ability to fulfill its constitutional 
mandate. He further stated that provincial legislatures viewed the NCOP as an ‘add on’ 
function and not part of the core business of provincial legislature. Thus provinces have 
failed to use available opportunities such as the NCOP to raise provincial concerns.8 
 
                                                           
5Motlante K Deputy President’s address at the NCOP strategic planning workshop (2009). 
6Motlante K( 2009). 
7Mbeki T Speech of Deputy President TM Mbeki at a conference on the NCOP (1998). 
8Mbeki T (1998).  
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The 2008 parliamentary assessment report was more critical of the NCOP. The view of the 
report was that the NCOP debates are misaligned and do not adequately discuss provincial 
issues during their debates in the national forum. This report further stated that the NCOP had 
not fulfilled its constitutional mandate since it neither engaged nor highlighted the needs of 
provinces and some of its debates had no link to provincial interests.9 The former Minister for 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) Sicelo Shiceka was among those 
who viewed the NCOP as an irrelevant institution. Shiceka questioned the effectiveness of 
the NCOP and suggested that it should be reviewed.10 
 
The weakness of the NCOP has been attributed to the democratic deficit in the manner in 
which it is composed. Its members are provincial representatives and they have not been 
directly elected by the people.11 The Centre for Policy Studies, states that there is a narrow 
interpretation that over emphasises the internal weaknesses of the NCOP including role 
confusion, poor administration and lack of resources. However, the inadequacies in the 
NCOP may only be understood upon adequate examination of its role in the broader political 
system.12 
 
The African National Congress (ANC) debated on various occasions within its structures the 
role of the provincial sphere of government and whether it should be removed or 
reviewed.13The ruling party proposed the removal of provinces or a review of the provincial 
                                                           
9Parliament of RSA Report of the independent panel assessment of Parliament(2008). 
10Legal brief Today Shicelo questions relevance of the NCOP (2010).  
11Murray C & Nijzink L The NCOP: A forum for legislative intergovernmental relations 
(2002) 66. 
12Kihato C & Rapoo T In poor voice: NCOP’s weakness flows from the Westminster system 
(2001). 
13African National Congress (ANC) Summit on provincial and local government (2010) 7. 
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sphere of governance.14 However, opposition parties including the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) have contrasting views. They maintain that provinces are 
critical for South Africa’s democracy. Helen Zille, the leader of the DA, stated that the 
provinces have substantial powers and the view that provinces are subservient to national 
laws and policies is incorrect.15  The existence of the NCOP is important for opposition 
parties possibly because they value the autonomous role of the provinces or want to protect 
their power bases.  
2. RESEARCH QUESTION 
It is clear from the above that the significance of the NCOP is a contested issue. This paper, 
therefore, seeks to investigate whether, in fact, the NCOP is a relevant institution. The thesis 
does so by examining whether or not the NCOP plays a significant role in the legislative 
process at national level, since this is its principal constitutional mandate. 
3. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Very little research has been conducted on the role of the NCOP even though it has been in 
existence since 1997.  Previous research also did not cover an entire parliamentary term of 
five years, as will be done in this paper. This paper, on the other hand, examines the nature of 
all the bills processed in an entire parliamentary term and the manner in which the bills were 
processed with a view to ascertaining the role the NCOP played. 
 
The NCOP is a unique institution and hence there are no similar houses against which it can 
be assessed or benchmarked.  It would be unfair to use standards to assess the performance of 
                                                           
14African National Congress (2010). 
15Zille H Scrapping the provinces a bad idea (2009). 
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provincial legislatures because they have different capacities and service delivery needs.16 
However, the debate should be guided by a clear consideration of the strengths and 
weaknesses of South Africa’s intergovernmental system. In addition, the work of the NCOP 
would be meaningless without the provincial participation and therefore this should be 
monitored.17 The findings of this paper will contribute to deepening the understanding of the 
role of the NCOP and will add to the existing literature on the impact and value of this 
institution. The paper will explain not only the mechanics of the NCOP but how it exercises 
its authority in the national legislative process. 
4. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This paper explores the role and relevance of the NCOP in the national legislative processes 
during the Third Parliament which covers the period between 2005 and 2009. The paper 
focuses on the legislative role the NCOP played. The NCOP’s other roles, including its 
oversight roles, will not be considered in this study. 
 
The debate on the abolition of provinces has been fuelled by differences in political 
ideologies, with the ruling party being largely in favour of abolishing or at least reviewing the 
role of the provinces.18The introduction of the metropolitan municipalities was viewed as an 
attempt by the ruling party to abolish the provinces and give power to the metros. Provinces 
have been observed to have failed in their role of being counterbalancing centers of power.  It 
is also argued that provinces should be structured in such a way that they become oversight 
bodies of local government.19If such debates persist and are translated into changes to the 
                                                           
16Memela T Speech by the Deputy Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces on the 
occasion of the democracy development programme’s 6th national annual government 
conference (2010). 
17Memela T (2010). 
18Kihato C & Rapoo T (2001). 
19Kihato C & Rapoo T (2001). 
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number and role of provinces, then the composition and relevance of the NCOP would be 
affected.  Even though it would be interesting to find out whether the challenges faced by the 
provinces have a direct impact on the role and functioning of the NCOP, it will not be 
covered in this paper.  
 
5. ARGUMENT 
Based on the examination of the NCOP’s role when processing bills in the Third Parliament, 
this paper argues that the NCOP has demonstrated its relevance and impact when processing 
national legislation. Furthermore, the paper will argue that the NCOP has fulfilled its 
constitutional mandate of representing provincial interests by playing a central role in 
processing legislative bills affecting provinces. Although there area limited number of 
permanent members of the NCOP who process the voluminous legislation, the paper will 
show that the NCOP has prioritised legislation affecting provinces and instituted meaningful 
amendments. 
The central argument of this paper confirms the relevance of the NCOP and further views the 
NCOP as a critical role player providing meaningful input in the national legislative process. 
 
6. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Limited research has been conducted on the role and functioning of the NCOP and on the 
impact of this institution. Pierre De Vos argues that the NCOP has not been successful in 
executing its mandate partly due to its composition and make up.20  Certain members are 
permanent delegates, while the special delegates function on a rotational basis which creates 
capacity challenges. Furthermore, NCOP members are elected after the national and 
                                                           
20De Vos P ‘Do not say goodbye to the NCOP yet’ (2010). 
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provincial parliament’s positions have been filled. This creates uncertainty about the caliber 
of the remaining representatives that are assigned to the NCOP.21The NCOP has faced 
challenges from its inception due to its young existence and uniqueness. The NCOP had to 
define its role as envisaged by the Constitution and thus would learn from its own 
experiences in order to be a bridge for the different spheres of government.22 
 
According to Christina, Murray and Lia Nijzink the NCOP is not redundant, but its role as 
envisaged by the Constitution has been underutilised.23 The political context of the NCOP has 
been cited as one of the challenges that inhibits the institution from fully exhibiting its 
potential as intended. 24 An assessment report of Parliament was issued in 2008 which 
indicated that the NCOP has not fully represented the interests of provinces.25 
 
The debates of the NCOP do not provide synergy on the link in representing or tackling 
issues of provincial interests but are more focused on national issues.26  Murray indicates that 
the content and debates in the NCOP varied.27Evidence has shown that the number of section 
76 bills processed by the NCOP in 2001 decreased from 20 in 2001 to only 11 of the 69 
bills.28 This implied that the number of bills affecting provinces at Parliament has reduced. 
Similarly, the numbers of section 76(1) bills, those introduced in the NA, were more than 
those introduced in the NCOP.  The reason for the decline was due to the decline in 
Parliament’s legislative agenda which primarily focused on issues of socio-economic 
                                                           
21De Vos P (2010). 
22Murray C, Hoffman-Wanderer Y & Saller K Speeding transformation: Monitoring and 
oversight in the NCOP (2004). 
23Murray C& Nijzink L (2002) 45. 
24Murray C& Nijzink L (2002) 45. 
25Parliament of RSA (2008). 
26Parliament of RSA (2008). 
27Murray C, Hoffman-Wanderer Y and Saller K NCOP second term 1999-2004 in Parliament 
of the Republic of South Africa (2004). 
28Murray C & Nijzink L (2002) 75. 
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transformation which fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of provinces. 29 
The paper examines whether or not the NCOP has improved in its impact on legislative 
processes since its establishment and whether it is adding value in national policy by 
highlighting provincial interests. Given the limited research on the functioning of the NCOP, 
this study contributes to providing some insight on the impact of the NCOP.   
 
7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study uses both qualitative and quantitative methods of data gathering. Quantitative 
research involves the statistical analysis of information. This paper looks at all the bills 
processed during the Third Parliament. Focus is directed at the number of bills tabled in 
Parliament and the number of interventions made by the NCOP. An analysis is presented 
based on the number of laws processed by the NCOP and its significance. 
 
Qualitative research is used as another method of analysis in reaching conclusions for this 
paper.  The qualitative method focuses on the interpretative quality of amendments instituted 
by the NCOP and the effectiveness or impact this has on the role of the NCOP in fulfilling its 
constitutional mandate. This paper provides insight into the operations of the NCOP and 
analyses the nature of amendments made by this institution in order to determine its value in 
promoting the interests of the provinces. The paper also monitors the regularity with which 
the executive introduced bills in the NCOP. 
 
                                                           
29Murray C & Nijzink L (2002) 75. 
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This paper relies on primary sources contained in minutes and supporting documents 
produced by Parliament and the Parliamentary Monitoring Group. Data were also gathered 
from secondary sources such as newspaper articles, media statements by the delegates of the 
NCOP and through seminar papers delivered on the role of the NCOP. Additional 
information was obtained from the parliamentary library that is, the bills reference materials. 
The committee proceedings were sourced either from the relevant committee secretaries or 
the Parliamentary Monitoring Group website.  Information gathered is presented according to 
the different category bills. 
 
8. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
This study consists of five chapters including this introductory chapter. Chapter two focuses 
on the composition of the NCOP and how its membership is formed. Furthermore, there is an 
outline of the functions performed by the NCOP. The third chapter explores the legal 
framework in which the NCOP functions, including the different types of bills it processes.  
The fourth chapter considers the legislative interventions of the NCOP and provides an 
assessment of how it has processed legislation during the period under review.  
The final chapter reviews the previous chapters, focusing on the argument and presents the 
findings of the research as well as the recommendations flowing from the findings. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NCOP 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a descriptive account of the constitutional framework in which the 
NCOP operates.  It discusses the history of the establishment of the NCOP. In exploring the 
value added by the NCOP in the legislative process, this chapter examines its composition, 
functions and operations. South Africa’s electoral system is considered and the impact it has 
on the ability of the NCOP to accomplish its constitutional mandate.  The membership of the 
NCOP is reviewed to see whether or not the NCOP has adequate resources to support the 
achievement of its constitutional role.  In addition, the chapter explores whether or not the 
composition and resources allocated to the NCOP are sufficient to enable it to effectively 
carry out its constitutional mandate. 
 
2. HISTORY OF THE NCOP 
The South African Constitution established a bi-cameral parliamentary system consisting of 
two houses namely, the National Assembly (NA) and the NCOP. Parliament is vested with 
legislative authority. 30 A bi-cameral parliamentary system generally allows for balanced 
quality control processes and reduces the risk of elective dictatorship.31 In the South African 
context, the bi-cameral system was established to provide for provincial participation in the 
national legislative process and to protect the interests of provinces.32 
 
                                                           
30S 43 (a) Constitution. 
31
 Comfort N Brewer’s politics:  A phrase and fable dictionary (1993) 44. 
32Brandt M From the Senate to the NCOP (2001). 
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The bi-cameral parliamentary system in South Africa can be traced back to colonial times. 
South Africa has retained the influences of the Westminster system even though it has 
experimented with other types of parliamentary systems. 33  A bi-cameral system was 
introduced by the South Africa Act of 1909, which provided for the Union of South Africa, 
with a Parliament comprised of the Senate and House of Assembly.34 The bi-cameral system 
was replaced in 1984 by a tri-cameral parliamentary system. 
 
During the transition to democracy and interim negotiations, there were deliberations on 
whether or not South Africa should adopt a federal state structure and governance system.35 
The National Party (NP) was in favour of the adoption of some form of federal state 
structure.  The ANC, however, was against the idea of a federal system being introduced in 
South Africa.36  As a compromise, semi-autonomous provinces were created with limited 
powers.37 This was affected with the adoption of the 1993 interim Constitution.  South Africa 
was henceforth transformed from a unitary state to a semi-federal state with nine provinces.38 
In addition, this interim Constitution created a second chamber for Parliament, referred to as 
the Senate in which all of the nine provinces were equally represented.39 
 
At the first democratic elections in 1994, the bi-cameral parliamentary system was, therefore, 
re-introduced in the form of the NA and the Senate.40 The Senate ‘functioned like a strange 
hybrid, which operated like a second chamber in a unitary state, yet its composition was 
                                                           
33Cloete J Parliaments of South Africa (1996) 14. 
34Cloete J (1996) 14. 
35De Vos P (2006) The Role of the National Council of Provinces in the governance of South 
Africa (2006) 614. 
36
 Inman P & Rubinfield D ‘Federalism and South Africa’s Democratic Bargain: The Zuma 
Challenge.’ www.law.berkeley.edu. 
37De Vos P (2006) 614. 
38De Vos P (2006) 616. 
39De Vos P (2006) 616. 
40De Vos P (2006) 614. 
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linked to the quasi-federal system of government’.41 It could pass all bills, except money 
bills, and had no veto power. It could however delay legislation. A resolution by the joint 
committee of Parliament was required when the Senate and the NA passed two different 
versions of the same bill.42 
 
The Senate did not have a distinctive role in the adoption of legislation due to limited 
functions afforded to the Senate by the interim Constitution.43In addition, the Senate was 
perceived to be ineffective, not fulfilling its role of representing the interests of provinces in 
Parliament and duplicating the role played by the NA.44. The Final Constitution therefore 
replaced the Senate with the NCOP.45 
 
3. COMPOSITION OF THE NCOP 
The legislative power is divided amongst three spheres: national; provincial and local 
government.46 The national legislative authority is located in the NA and the NCOP.47 The 
legislative authority in the second sphere of government resides with the provincial 
legislatures.48 The most important legislative functional areas of the national and provincial 
governments are shared in a system of concurrent jurisdiction.49 
 
                                                           
41De Vos P (2006) 616. 
42The interim Constitution (1993). 
43De Vos P (2006) 617. 
44De Vos P (2006) 617. 
45De Vos P (2006) 618. 
46Ss 44, 104 and 156 Constitution. 
47S 44(1) Constitution. 
48S 104 (1) Constitution. 
49Stephen Segopotso Tongoane and Others vs. Minister of Agriculture, Land Affairs and 
Others (2010) (8) BCLR 741 (CC). 
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The establishment of the NCOP was inspired by the German Bundesrat model which was 
adapted to the South African context.50  The Constitution adopted the approach whereby 
provinces partake in the decision making process through provincial mandates.51 The NCOP 
hence broke away from the traditional role of second houses that were developed from the 
Westminster model.52 
 
The NCOP members are not directly elected to serve in the NCOP. They are representatives 
of provinces. They are therefore nominated by their respective provinces to serve at 
Parliament. The delegation of each province is expected to reflect the strength of party 
political representation in the provinces, as set out in schedule 3 of the Constitution.53Thirty 
days after elections the provincial legislatures determine, in accordance with the 
Determination of Delegates (NCOP) Act 69 of 1998, the delegates to be sent from each party 
in the provincial council.54 
 
Each province sends ten provincial delegates to serve as members of the NCOP.  Organised 
local government is represented in the NCOP by ten non-voting delegates. The NCOP thus 
has a total of 100 members.55 The ten provincial delegates are divided into four special 
delegates and six permanent delegates.56 Hence only 54 out of the 100 members of the NCOP 
are permanent delegates who reside at national parliament to fulfill its function, as opposed to 
                                                           
50De Vos P (2006) 618. 
51Murray C & Nijzink L The NCOP (2002) 45. 
52
 Calland R & Nijzink L Intergovernmental Relations in the Legislative Branch of 
Government (2001) 112-113. 
53S 61(1) Constitution. 
54
 S 61 (2) (a) Constitution. 
55Determination of Delegates (NCOP) Act 69 of 1998. 
56Determination of Delegates (NCOP) Act 69 of 1998. 
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the NA that has about 400 members.57 The rest of the NCOP members are special delegates 
and 10 organised local government representatives.  
  
Special delegates consist of members of the provincial executive and provincial legislature as 
determined by the area of specialty. The special delegates often include the provincial 
premier, who is the head of the provincial delegation, and three other delegates. 58  The 
premier may designate a member of the provincial legislature to head the delegation for any 
general or specific business of the NCOP when he or she is unavailable.59 Special delegates 
participate on certain occasions based on the specific nature of the subject to be discussed in 
the NCOP. Hence, for example, a member of the provincial legislature who sits on the health 
portfolio of the provincial legislature attends as special delegate at a session where the NCOP 
deals with issues relating to health. The permanent delegates’ term expires at the next 
national elections.60 Furthermore, permanent delegates lose their status once they become 
members of the provincial legislature or lose the confidence of their party in the provincial 
legislature.61 
 
The NCOP delegates are not part of the national or provincial lists of the political parties 
since they are indirectly elected by the provincial councils after the latter have been elected. 
Members of the political parties’ national list serve in the NA depending on the number of 
seats won during a vote. The top members in the province’s list will serve in the Provincial 
Legislatures. After this allocation, the members of the NCOP are nominated and this in effect 
                                                           
57S 46 (1) Constitution. 
58
 S 60 (2)(a)(i) Constitution. 
59S 60 (2) (a) and  (3) Constitution. 
60S 62 Constitution. 
61S 62 (4) Constitution. 
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means that they are the third group of identified representatives. Thus the NCOP members act 
as the ‘third team’ and possibly not the strongest of the political representatives, which 
weakens the role of the NCOP. This caliber of membership compromises the quality of 
legislative scrutiny conducted by the NCOP and its ability to scrutinize the amendments 
brought by the NA. 
 
4. FUNCTIONS OF THE NCOP 
The legislative power of the NCOP includes the power to consider, pass, amend, propose or 
reject amendments to legislation brought to it.62 The NCOP may also initiate or prepare 
legislative bills on matters listed in schedule 4 of the Constitution. These are concurrent 
functional areas of both the national and provincial spheres of government. The NCOP may 
also initiate legislative processes on matters referred to under section 76(3) of the 
Constitution. It may not, however, initiate or prepare money bills.63 
 
Other functions of the NCOP include conducting oversight by summoning any person, 
including institutions, to give evidence, submit reports or make presentations.64 However, for 
the purposes of this paper, attention will focus on the legislative function of the NCOP since 
this is the primary function of the NCOP. 
 
                                                           
62S 68 (a) Constitution. 
63S 68 (b) Constitution  
64S 69 Constitution.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
The above discussion shows that the main reason for the existence of the NCOP is to ensure 
that provincial interests are protected when laws are considered and passed in the national 
legislature. However, the number and caliber of delegates in the NCOP potentially 
compromises its ability to successfully implement its mandate.65 
 
The NCOP should ensure that it achieves its constitutional mandate because the Senate, its 
predecessor, was scrapped as it did not properly fulfill its mandate and duplicated the work of 
the NA. Changing the name of the Senate has informed and amplified this institution’s 
primary role of being a council for the provinces and representing provincial interests. 
Amongst its various functions the NCOP is primarily tasked with passing laws and ensuring 
that provincial interests are incorporated and protected when passing these laws.  
 
The uniqueness of the NCOP affords it opportunities to break new ground in South Africa by 
ensuring that the system of decentralised government is able to work effectively. The 
composition of NCOP members clearly strengthens this vision of debating provincial 
interests in the national forum because the delegates come directly from the provinces. 
 
 
  
                                                           
65Murray C & Nijzink L (2002) 57. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE NCOP FRAMEWORK FOR PROCESSING BILLS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the role that the Constitution envisages the NCOP must play in the 
legislative processes at national level. The chapter therefore describes the procedures 
followed in the process of adopting bills and the role the NCOP plays in this respect. The 
chapter makes particular reference to the tagging process which is important for determining 
the route a bill follows during the parliamentary processes and the role that the NCOP plays. 
The chapter further describes how the classification of bills affects the participation of 
provinces. The chapter discusses the role played by the NCOP in processing different types 
of bills. 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The Constitution identifies four different types of legislation. These are bills amending the 
Constitution (section 74), bills not affecting provinces (section 75), bills affecting provinces 
(section 76), and money bills (section 77). The parliamentary rules identified an additional 
type of bill i.e. a mixed bill.66 The procedures for adopting each of these bills are found in the 
relevant sections of the Constitution. However, money bills are dealt with in accordance with 
the procedure established in section 75 of the Constitution. 67  The category to which a 
particular bill belongs is determined through the tagging process.68 The tagging process also 
determines the role that the NCOP plays in the adoption of the relevant bill. The tagging 
                                                           
66Joint Task Team Report Reviewing the legislative process in Parliament: Tagging Bills 
(2008)12. 
67S 77(3) Constitution. 
68De Vos P (2006) 637. 
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process is therefore very critical. An incorrect classification of a bill affects the validity of the   
bill once adopted.69 
 
3. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS OF THE NCOP 
The Constitution envisages that the NCOP plays different roles when processing different 
types of legislation, depending on whether the bill directly or indirectly affects the provinces. 
This differentiation affects the voting process as outlined in section 65 of the Constitution.70 
The time allocated for public participation also differs depending on whether or not the 
proposed legislation affects provinces.  
 
The NCOP has wider authority on legislation affecting provinces than ordinary bills not 
affecting provinces. This authority is evident from the process followed to secure agreement 
between the NA and the NCOP. Below is a detailed review of the role the NCOP is allocated 
when processing the different types of legislations.  
3.1 Bills amending the Constitution 
3.1.1 The nature of bills amending the Constitution 
Bills amending the Constitution consist of four different types. 71  The first type of 
constitutional amendment bill involves the amendment of section 1 of the Constitution which 
is referred to as the founding provision.  The NCOP performs a critical role in the amendment 
of these types of bills, since at least six provinces have to vote in favor of the bill for it to be 
                                                           
69Stephen Segopotso Tongoane and Others v Minister of Agriculture, Land Affairs and 
Others 2010 (6) SA 214 (CC).  
70S 65 Constitution. 
71De Vos P (2006) 643. 
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passed. Additionally, the bill has to be supported by 75 percent of the members of the NA.72 
Members of the NCOP vote in blocks instead of individually when voting on bills amending 
the Constitution.73 A bill amending the Bill of Rights needs to be supported by six provinces 
in the NCOP and by a two-thirds majority in the NA.74 
 
The third group of bills amending the constitution deals with any other provisions of the 
Constitution, ‘that alters provincial boundaries, powers, functions or institutions’.75 These 
bills require the supporting vote of at least six provinces and a two-thirds majority in the 
NA.76  Other bills amending the Constitution are concerned with amendments to specific 
provincial matters.77 When a bill amending the Constitution concerns a specific province or 
provinces, the NCOP may not pass that particular bill or relevant part of the bill unless 
approved by the relevant provincial legislature or affected legislatures.78 
 
The last category of bills is those dealing with provisions of the Constitution other than those 
referred to above. These bills only require the NA to pass the amendments with a two-thirds 
majority.79 
                                                           
72S 74 (1) Constitution. 
73S 65 Constitution, where a province has one vote to cast on behalf of the province by the 
head of the delegation. 
74S 74 (2) Constitution. 
75S 74 (3) (b) (ii) Constitution. 
76S 74 (3) (a) (b) 
77S 74 (3) (b) (iii) Constitution. 
78S 74 (8) Constitution. 
79S 74 (3) (a) Constitution. 
The bill should be published in the government gazette for public comment, thirty days prior 
to its introduction by a person or a Committee in Parliament and must be submitted to the 
provincial legislatures to obtain their views. Written submissions on the bill either from the 
provincial legislatures or the public should be tabled in the NA on the introduction of the bill. 
If the House is not scheduled to sit within two working days, the bill will be sent to the 
relevant committee79.  The process followed for amending the Constitution occurs through 
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3.1.2 The procedure for bills amending the Constitution 
Bills amending the Constitution must follow the procedure set out in section 74 to the 
Constitution.  A section 74 bill is first tabled in the NA. The chairperson of the NCOP sends 
the bill, when it is referred to him or her, to the speakers of provincial legislatures with an 
accompanying memorandum for consideration and to obtain provincial mandates.  There are 
no mediation procedures available with regards to bills amending the Constitution. Both 
houses must pass the bill with the required majorities. 
 
The Constitution does not expressly state that the NCOP has a veto power on the 
aforementioned bills.80 The NCOP will only consider a section 74 bill once it has been passed 
by the NA. The NCOP rules provide that the process to be followed when considering section 
76 or section 74, subsection (1) or (2) bills, should be conducted in a manner that will ensure 
that provinces have sufficient time to consider the bills and confer mandates.81 Time should 
be set aside to allow provincial legislatures to comment on the bills.82 The comments from 
the provincial legislatures are tabled in the NA and where necessary in the NCOP.83 
 
Debates have ensued regarding the voting requirements for the amendment of the 
Constitution. The contention is whether the special voting requirements should be limited 
only to section 1 of the Constitution or they should also be extended to other provisions of the 
Constitution that are inconsistent with the founding provisions as contained in section 1 of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
provincial delegations or mandate. The provincial block vote is more stringent and has more 
requirements for passing this type of legislation.  With regards to other bills that amend the 
Constitution but have no direct implication on provinces, the NCOP may debate the 
constitutional amendment but it is not required to approve the bill. 
80Bundler S‘National Legislative Authority’ (1996) 17-10. 
81Rule 240 NCOP Rules. 
82S 74 (5) (b) Constitution. 
83S 74 (6) Constitution. 
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Constitution.84 In the judgment of United Democratic Movement & Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa & Others, the court accepted the view that the majority vote applies 
to the amendment of other provisions of the Constitution, which is inconsistent with the 
founding values.85 
 
3.2 Ordinary bills not affecting provinces 
Ordinary bills not affecting provinces follow the procedure set out in section 75 of the 
Constitution.86All bills not dealing with concurrent functions between national and provincial 
competence (schedule 4) and exclusive provincial competence (schedule 5) are regulated in 
the form of section 75 bills.87These bills are introduced in the NA since they do not affect the 
provinces. The NCOP may pass, reject, or propose amendments to such bills.88 If the NCOP 
does not propose amendments when considering section 75 bills, then the bill would be 
referred to the president for assent.89 If the NCOP rejects the bill or proposes amendments to 
it, the bill would be referred back to the NA for further consideration. In such cases, the NA 
may decide to pass the bill again with or without amendments or not proceed with the bill.90 
                                                           
84Budlender S  (1996). 
85United Democratic movement & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & 
Others 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC), 2002 (11) BCLR 1179 (CC) paras 18-20 and 75. 
86S 75 Constitution. Although section 75 bills do not directly affect provinces, the NCOP 
must nevertheless consider and pass them (s 44(1)(b)(iii) of the Constitution. This clearly 
illustrates that provincial views are regarded as important and not neglected in any aspect of 
the national legislative process. 
87De Vos P (2006) 639. 
88S 75 (1) Constitution.  
The Second Certification Judgment described the role of the NCOP with regard to section 75 
legislation as “no more than a delaying power” which suggest the NCOP has limited 
authority over this type of legislation as it can be overridden by a simple NA majority.  Ex 
Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the amended text of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 1997 (2) SA 97(CC) (certification judgment 
II) para 64. 
89S 75(1)(b) Constitution . 
90S 75(1)(c) Constitution. 
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The voting process for a bill is critical and is determined by the procedure set out by section 
65 of the Constitution.  When passing a section 75 bill, each representative of the NCOP 
votes in their individual capacity.  Each provincial delegate has one vote and passing the 
legislation is determined by the majority of votes of which there should be at least a third of 
the delegates to form a quorum.91 
 
3.3 Ordinary bills affecting provinces 
3.3.1 Nature of the bill 
There are two kinds of bills affecting provinces:  section 76 (1) bills and section 76(2) bills.92 
Section 76(1) bills are introduced in the NA while section 76 (2) bills are introduced in the 
NCOP. Ordinary bills affecting provinces that are initiated under extraordinary circumstances 
may only be introduced in the NA. 93 Extraordinary circumstances refer to maintaining 
national security by regulating areas of exclusive provincial competence and are introduced 
only in the NA.94 
 
A bill affecting provinces follows the procedure prescribed in section 76 of the Constitution. 
The Constitution has built in more features concerning the role of provinces in relation to 
these types of legislation. This is evident from the manner in which the NCOP is required to 
vote on these bills.  
                                                           
91S 75 (2) Constitution 
92Rules of the National Assembly(2008) Chapter 1. 
93S 76 (4) Constitution. Ordinary bills affecting provinces deal with functional areas of 
concurrent national and provincial legislative competence as found in Schedule 4 of the 
Constitution. The Constitution further recognizes topics listed in Schedule 4 to potentially 
have a wider reach as informed by section 44(3) of the Constitution.  This section states that 
‘Legislation with regard to a matter that is reasonably necessary for or incidental to, the 
effective exercise of a power concerning any matter listed in Schedule 4 is, for all purposes, 
legislation with regard to a matter listed in Schedule4.’ 
94S 44 (2) Constitution. 
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3.3.2 Procedure followed for section 76 bills 
The executive introduces a bill either in the NA or the NCOP.95The chairperson of the NCOP 
sends a copy of a section 76 bill, when it is referred to the NCOP, to the speakers of the 
provincial legislatures for consideration. The provincial legislature confers a mandate on its 
provincial delegation to the NCOP.  The Constitution allows Parliament to enact legislation 
regulating the procedure of instituting provincial mandates on members of the NCOP.96 The 
Mandating Procedures of Provinces Act facilitates uniform procedure for provincial 
legislatures to confer authority on their delegations when casting votes on their behalf.97  This 
is done by the provincial legislature through conferring the mandate to its delegation either to 
propose amendments to the bill or to pass the bill without amendments. If a bill affecting 
provinces, introduced in the NA is passed by the NCOP without amendments, then it will be 
referred to the president for assent so that it may be signed into law.98 
 
3.3.3 Legislative cycle 
The NCOP, when considering section 76 bills, usually operates on a four week cycle. The 
NCOP is briefed by the relevant executive authority on the proposed bill or amendments to 
the bill. During the second week, the NCOP delegates brief their provincial legislatures on 
the proposed bill or amendments.  
 
 
 
                                                           
95In most cases bills are initiated and drafted by the Department concerned and incase of 
ordinary bills affecting provinces the Minister will direct the bill to the intergovernmental 
forum of National Ministers and Members of the Executive Council (MINMEC). 
96S65(2) Constitution. 
97Mandating Procedures of Provinces Act 52 of 2008. 
98S 76 (1) (b) Constitution. 
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Figure 1:  Legislative cycle of a section 76 bill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Parliament Website 
The provincial legislature confers authority on its provincial delegation to the NCOP to 
negotiate when the relevant select committee considers a bill and may include proposed 
amendments to the bill.99As depicted in Figure 1, during the third week of the legislative 
cycle, the NCOP considers the negotiating mandates of the various provinces. 100  The 
                                                           
99S 5 of Mandating Procedures of Provinces Act 52 of 2008. 
Usually during this process the provincial legislature and executive review the bills carefully 
before instructing their delegates on how to vote. Should a province realize that it does not 
have the capacity to implement a certain provision in the bill then it would instruct its 
provincial delegate to raise the concern when the NCOP meets to consider the bill so that the 
amendments incorporate the province’s need. 
100
 Prior to the NCOP plenary, the provincial legislature will confer authority to its provincial 
delegation to cast a vote when the relevant select committee considers the bill in the form of a 
final mandate which is usually faxed or mailed.  If no matters arise when the select 
committee deliberates on the final mandates which may necessitate the consideration of the 
provincial legislature, then the provincial delegation should table its final negotiating 
mandate to the NCOP plenary as the province’s voting mandate. 
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provincial legislature confers voting authority on the head of the provincial delegation to cast 
a vote at the NCOP plenary.101Voting takes place during the last week of the NCOP’s 
legislative cycle. The NCOP delegates vote according to the mandates that they are given by 
their respective provinces. Therefore, they are provided with sufficient time to discuss 
matters and formulate positions. 
 
3.3.4 Section 76 procedures for bills introduced in the NA 
Bills affecting provinces introduced in the NA follow the procedure set out in section 76 (1) 
of the Constitution.  According to Joint Rule 184, after the NA has passed a section 76 (1) 
bill, it is referred to the relevant select committee in the NCOP through the chairperson. The 
NCOP may pass, amend, or reject the bill. 102  If the NCOP passes the bill without 
amendments then the bill must be sent to the president for assent.103 
 
When the NCOP passes the bill with amendments, the amended bill is referred to the NA for 
consideration. If the NA passes the NCOP’s proposed amendments, the bill will be sent to the 
president for assent.104The bill is sent to a mediation committee that is set up under section 78 
of the Constitution if the NA rejects the proposed amendments by the NCOP or the NCOP 
rejects the bill.105 
 
The mediation committee is established to facilitate a resolution when there are 
disagreements between the two houses. The mediation committee consists of nine members 
                                                           
101S 8 Act 52 of 2008. 
102S 76 (1) (a) Constitution. 
103S 76 (1) (b) Constitution. 
104S 76 (1) (c) Constitution. 
105S 76 (1) (d) Constitution. 
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of the NA and a similar number from the NCOP representing each province. 106   The 
mediation committee may agree to adopt the NA’s version of the bill, or the NCOP’s version, 
or come up with a new version.107If the mediation committee agrees on the NA’s version of 
the bill, it will be referred to the NCOP and if passed by the NCOP referred to the 
president.108 However if the mediation committee agrees on the NCOP’s version of the bill, it 
would be referred to the NA for it to be passed and sent to the president for his assent. 109If 
the mediation committee agrees on a different version of the bill, it is referred to both houses 
for adoption.110 
 
The bill lapses even if the mediation committee agrees on the NA’s version of a bill or it 
comes with its own alternative version, if the NCOP rejects it, unless the NA passes it with a 
two-thirds majority.111 The bill also lapses if the mediation committee refers it to the NA 
having agreed on the NCOP’s version of amendments or its own version and the NA does not 
pass it. The NA may later pass its original version with a two-thirds majority.112 
 
3.3.5 Section 76 procedures for bills introduced in the NCOP 
Ordinary bills affecting provinces introduced in the NCOP are referred to as section 76 (2) 
bills and follow the procedures set out in the Constitution.113After having been considered by 
the NCOP, the bill is referred to the NA for consideration, which may pass, reject or propose 
                                                           
106S 78 (1) Constitution. 
107S 76 (1) (d) Constitution. 
108S 76 (1) (f) Constitution. 
109S 76 (1) (g) Constitution. 
110S 76 (1) (h) Constitution. 
111S 76 (1) (i) Constitution. 
112
 S 76 (1) (j) Constitution. 
113Rules of the National Assembly (2008) Chapter 1. 
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amendments to the bill.114The bill is referred to the mediation committee if the two houses 
disagree on the amendments proposed to it.115The bill lapses if the mediation committee is 
unable to agree on a version of the bill within 30 days.116 If the mediation committee agrees 
of the NCOP’s version of the bill then it will be sent to the president for assent.117 f the NA 
rejects the NCOP amendments or the mediation committee’s version of the bill then the bill 
will lapse.118 
3.4 Mixed bills 
A mixed bill contains both section 76 and section 75 provisions. Legal uncertainty arises 
when determining the procedure to be followed when processing mixed bills. If a bill falls 
outside of a schedule 4 functional area, it will be classified as a section 75 bill, even though it 
might contain incidental matters that would touch on matters listed in schedule 4 functional 
areas.  
Parliament has opted to deal with section 75 and section 76 provisions of the bill separately 
although some lawyers have expressed doubt on the constitutional validity of mixed bills.119 
The Joint Rules refer to these types of bills as impermissible and the mixed bill needs to be 
divided into two where one part follows the section 75 procedure and the other follows the 
section 76 procedure.120 
Splitting of bills can be a challenging process in that sometimes a section 75 bill would pass 
with blank sections and the section 76 part of the bill once passed would complete the entire 
bill. When voting on mixed bills, the members of the NCOP vote both as individuals and per 
                                                           
114S 76 (2) (a) Constitution. 
115S 76 (2) (d) Constitution. 
116S 76 (2) (e) Constitution. 
117S 76 (2) (f) Constitution. 
118S 76 (2) (i) Constitution. 
119Budlender S(1996)17-33. 
120Joint Rule 194. 
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province.  The vote by the provinces is taken first.121 The voting process for mixed bills has 
been challenging especially for the provinces that are required to submit provincial mandates 
on an incomplete bill. This is due to fact that section 75 bills do not require provincial 
mandates and thus the section 75 part of a mixed bill would not necessarily be brought to the 
provinces.  
3.5 Money bills 
Money bills are those that are mentioned under section 77 of the Constitution. These bills 
seek to appropriate money, impose national tax, levies, duties or surcharges amongst 
others.122 The Minister of Finance is the only minister with the authority to introduce money 
bills.123 Money bills follow the procedure set out in section 75 and the NCOP delegates vote 
on an individual basis. This means that the NA can override the NCOP with a simple 
majority should there be a conflict between the NA and NCOP when considering money 
bills.  Previously the NCOP did not have the authority to amend money bills. However, the 
new Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act 9 of 2009 allows 
Parliament to amend budgets of departments.  
4. TAGGING BILLS 
Tagging is a process followed in Parliament for classifying bills, and it determines the role 
the NCOP may play in passing a particular bill. This important process identifies the role 
played by the provinces when considering section 76 bills and the impact it has on the 
provinces’ ability to fully exercise their role when considering national legislation.124The 
Constitution has carefully crafted the representation of provinces when processing section 76 
legislation.  
                                                           
121Joint Rule 197. 
122S 77 (1) Constitution  
123S 73 (2) Constitution 
124Tongoane (para 69). 
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4.1 Tests for tagging 
The Constitutional Court differentiated between the test for legislative competence which is 
called the ‘pith and substance test’ and the test used in determining the tagging of a bill, 
referred to as the ‘substantial measure test’. 125The substantial measure test looks at the 
provisions of the bill with an eye to determining the extent that they may substantially affect 
functional areas listed in schedule 4of the Constitution. The substantial measure test does not 
concern itself with provisions that are incidental to its substance.126Furthermore, the test 
ensures that section 76 bills are enacted in a manner that allows provinces to be represented 
fully and effectively.   
4.2 Tagging process 
The process of tagging bills is usually simple. However, there are instances where issues 
intermingle, requiring a breakdown of the phrase, ‘with regard to any matter within a 
functional area listed in schedule 4 as this lies at the heart of confusion in interpretation’.127A 
bill is commonly introduced in Parliament by the executive and accompanied by a 
memorandum with the proposed procedure to be followed as certified by the state law 
advisor. 128 However, the final decision on the tagging of a bill is taken by a joint committee 
of Parliament with representatives from both houses.129 The Speaker of the NA then refers 
the proposed bill to the Joint Tagging Mechanism (JTM) for classification and to determine 
the procedure that the bill will follow in Parliament.130The JTM consists of the Speaker and 
                                                           
125Tongoane (para 37). 
126Tongoanepara 59. 
127
 Murray C & Simeon R ‘Tagging bills in Parliament section 75 or section 76?’ (2006) 242. 
128
 S 73 Constitution. 
129Joint Rule 153 (1). 
130Joint Rule 151. 
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Deputy Speaker of the NA, including the chairperson and permanent deputy chairperson of 
the NCOP.131This structure allows for equal representation from both houses of Parliament.  
When tagging takes place in Parliament, the focus is confined to the functional areas listed in 
schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution.  Parliament looks at the subject matter of the bill and 
how the issues contained in the bills relate to systems of power and responsibility as divided 
amongst the three spheres of government in South Africa.132The NA and the NCOP members 
or provincial legislatures may make a written submission to the JTM on how the bill should 
be classified.133 Should the JTM members not agree on the classification of a bill, then the 
joint rules allow for a second legal opinion to be sourced from a constitutional expert 
approved by the JTM.134 If no resolution is reached then the matter will be referred to the NA 
and the NCOP. If the challenge still persists then the Constitutional Court decides on the 
dispute regarding the tagging of the bill.135 
The courts have not provided much jurisprudence with regard to the classification of bills.  
However, the Constitutional Court has indicated that functional areas of the three spheres of 
government should be purposively interpreted.  An example of a case where a bill was 
wrongly classified,136 as a section 76 instead of section 75, involved the Communal Land 
Rights Act (CLaRA) which was a bill at that stage.137 
                                                           
131Joint rules 151. 
132Murray C and Simeon  (2006)  242. 
133Joint Rule, 154. 
134Joint Rule, 153 (3.) 
135Joint Rule, 153 (5) and (6). 
136The processing of CLARA failed to comply with section 76(3) which was a material part of 
law making process when following section 76 procedures.  CLARA did not comply with 
section 76(3) of the Constitution and was thus declared to be invalid. The act was therefore 
considered to be unconstitutional in its entirety. This resulted became the consequence of a bill 
that was tagged incorrectly. 
137Tongoane (para 10). 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The chapter has outlined the role of the NCOP in the national legislative process. As this 
discussion clearly shows, the NCOP has greater authority on bills affecting provinces 
including when there is conflict on the proposed amendments between the NA and NCOP.  
The chapter further enquired into the tagging process of Parliament because of the significant 
impact this has on the process a bill needs to follow in Parliament and implications should 
errors occur in the classification of such bills.  
There has been uncertainty about the term ‘provincial interests’ in the national forum. 
However, it would be fair to treat the ‘provincial interests’ as mandates that provincial 
delegates receive from their provincial legislatures to represent the views of their province on 
that specified piece of legislation.138  The procedural safeguards for processing different bills 
are designed to give weight to provinces. They are therefore more than mere procedural 
safeguards and are fundamental to the role of the NCOP in ensuring that provincial interests 
are taken into account.139 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                           
138Boskati N Promoting Provincial Interests: the role of the NCOP in the national legislature 
(2005). 
139Tangoane (para 66). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
ASSESSMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY BY THE NCOP 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the value added by the NCOP in processing bills that were introduced 
during the Third Parliament, which covers the period from 2004 to2009. Both a qualitative 
and quantitative assessment of the laws the NCOP processed in the form of bills during the 
Third Parliament is provided. Special focus is directed at section 74, 75 and 76 bills. 
Although an analysis of section 77 bills also forms part of this chapter, the money bills are 
not discussed in detail because they follow a similar procedure to that established for 
processing section 75 bills. Case studies of mixed bills are featured to provide context to how 
Parliament processed these types of bills.  
This chapter shows general trends of legislation processed by the Third Parliament in terms 
of the different types of bills brought before Parliament. It also highlights the trends in each 
type of bill and the role played by the NCOP in those different bills. This chapter examines 
the type of amendments proposed by the NCOP, whether these amendments were 
incorporated into law, and whether or not they were rejected by the NA. This will determine 
the strength of the NCOP and value in proposing amendments and whether or not they have 
such a significant impact that they become law that is binding in the country.  
2. BACKGROUND 
Soon after its establishment, the NCOP was seen to be reasonably active when dealing with 
section 75 bills which only affected provinces. 140 According to the Intergovernmental 
Relations Audit report, the NCOP’s committee composition was not aligned to the functional 
                                                           
140Ministry and Department of Provincial and Local Government Intergovernmental 
Relations in the legislative branch of government: The Role and Function of the National 
Council of Provinces (1999) Chapter 4.  
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areas of provinces during the 1997 to1999 periods. An analogy provided by the 
Intergovernmental Relations Audit Report, indicated that the Select Committee on Justice, for 
instance, considered issues of justice, defence, correctional services, intelligence and safety 
yet, all these matters, with the exception of safety and security, fell outside provincial 
competence.141 Therefore, the NCOP was misaligned in its scope of work and constitutional 
mandate of representing provincial issues, since only 20 percent of the issues it considered 
fell within the area that affected the provinces.  
In 1999 Parliament processed 60 bills and in 2000 a total of 70 bills were processed.142 It is 
important to note that this was the Second Democratic Parliament and a pivotal milestone in 
the history of South Africa and these bills sought to introduce major policy changes.143 
Ordinary bills affecting provinces referred to Parliament were much fewer than those bills not 
affecting provinces. The number of bills affecting provinces dropped from 1999 to 2001 and 
as a result in 2001, only 11 of the 69 bill passed were section76 bills.144 Murray and Nijzink 
noted an increase in the number of section 76 bills introduced in the NCOP during 1999, 
although they were still significantly lessthan the section 76 bills introduced in the NA.145 
3. METHODOLOGY 
For data capturing purposes, the study focused on all bills processed during the Third 
Parliament. This information was gathered from the Parliament’s document section which 
tracks the process a bill takes when proceeding through the parliamentary process, and 
records any developments made on a bill during its passage through Parliament. In addition, 
bills adopted by the two houses, are published in the Parliamentary Bills handbook and stored 
                                                           
141Ministry and Department of Provincial and Local Government (1999). 
142Murray C & Nijzink L (2002) 43. 
143Murray C & Nijzink L (2002) 43. 
144Murray C & Nijzink L (2002) 43. 
145Murray C & Nijzink L (2002) 43. 
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in Parliament’s archives together with their amendments. The method used in calculating the 
bills processed by Parliament proved to be challenging in that sometimes bills are carried 
over from one year to the next. An example would be the National Ports Authority bill [B5-
2003] that was introduced in 2003 during the Second Parliament but was still considered in 
2005 by the Third Parliament. This bill was considered and passed towards the end of 2004 
by the NA.146 However, it had to be referred to the NCOP and it was adopted in 2005.147 
Thus in terms of the calculations, it would be reflected in the bills processed in 2005 because 
that is the year it was considered and concluded.  
The challenge became evident when considering bills covering a two year period, for 
example, a bill introduced in one year (2005) and passed in the following year (2006). Bills 
were counted in the year they were finalised. Another challenge included instances where a 
bill is considered late in the year by the NA and then processed the following year by the 
NCOP. The paper counted the bills in the year in which they were actually passed by 
Parliament. The quantitative analysis of bills posed serious analytical challenges due to the 
factors alluded to above.  
4. BILLS PROCESSED BY PARLIAMENT FROM 2004 TO 2009 
4.1 Quantity and nature of bills 
The term ‘Processed Bills’ referred to in Figure 2, includes all the bills that have been 
introduced in Parliament and have gone through vigorous parliamentary processes including 
those that would be delayed, withdrawn or lapsed.  Figure 2shows the number of bills 
processed by Parliament and classified into the different procedures followed. 
Figure 2:  Bills processed by Parliament 
                                                           
146Portfolio Committee on TransportNational Ports Authority Bill Adoption (2004). 
147Select Committee on Public ServiceDeliberation and Adoption of the National Ports 
Authority bill (2005). 
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Source: Parliament Document Archives 
During the Third Parliament, a total of 230 bills were processed.  The Third Parliament 
processed mainly ordinary bills not affecting provinces. A total of 159 section 75 bills were 
processed by Parliament representing69 percent of all bills. The bills affecting provinces are 
significantly lower than those not affecting provinces and amountedto 38 percent of bills 
processed during the period under review. This low number of section 76 bills constitutes 
only 12 percent of all bills processed by Parliament. Figure 3 gives the percentage of bills 
processed by Parliament during the Third Parliament. 
 
Figure 3:  Bills processed by Parliament during 2004-2009 
 
Source: Parliamentary bills document archives 
More than two-thirds of bills were processed as section75 bills as reflected in Figure 3. 
Parliament also considered five constitutional amendments, which accounts for two percent 
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of all the bills. The very few constitutional amendment bills reflect on the stability of the 
Constitution. 
Figure 4 shows the number of bills processed by Parliament per year over a five year period. 
There were more section 75 bills processed every year in the period under review.  The 
section 76 bills have been fluctuating over the years from nine bills processed in 2005 
decreasing to six bills in 2006; however there is a slow increase thereafter with two bills 
processed in 2008.  
Figure 4:  Types of bills per year 
 
Source: Document Archives 
The years 2004 and 2009 reflect the least number of bills compared to any other year.  In this 
period 32 bills were processed by Parliament. However, if combined, they show the same 
average number of bills as the years 2005 to 2007. This may be as a result of the Third 
Parliamentary session which began after June 2004 and ended in May 2009 because of the 
national and provincial elections.  Figure 4shows a steady increase in the frequency of bills 
processed from 2006 to 2008, although there was a decline in 2006. This indicates the 
movement of ordinary bills not affecting provinces, from 24 bills in the year 2006, to 27 bills 
in 2007 and a sharp increase to 49 bills in the year 2008. The section 75 bills processed in 
2008 almost doubled those processed in other years. This could be as a result of the executive 
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pushing legislation through before the end of their term as it was a year just before national 
elections.   
4.2 Bills amending the Constitution 
The Third Parliament has processed five bills amending the Constitution. All bills required 
NCOP approval except for Fifteenth Constitutional Amendments which was finalised without 
provincial inputs. The Twelfth Constitutional Amendment Bill, sought to repeal all 
constitutional provisions dealing with Cross Boundary Municipalities.148 A decision was 
taken in 2002 to abolish cross boundary municipalities and to change provincial boundaries 
so that all municipalities fell within one province. Thus the provisions contained in the 
Constitution which provided for the establishment of cross boundary municipalities were 
deleted. The bill incorporated the Merafong City Local Municipality into the Southern 
District Municipality of the North West and the provinces played a substantial role in this 
process. 
 
The Twelfth Constitutional Amendment Bill brought changes that would directly affect 
certain provinces by eliminating cross boundary municipalities and thus public hearings were 
held with the people, to ensure that they were consulted about the changes that would affect 
them. All provinces supported the bill. Gauteng (GP) also supported the bill and in addition 
made special arrangements between GP and North West to ensure that service delivery 
standards would be maintained in Marafong Municipality.149 
Members of the Merafong community challenged the validity of the TwelfthConstitutional 
Amendment Act. The applicants requested the Constitutional Court to declare that the 
                                                           
148Constitution Twelfth Amendment Bill[B33-2005]. 
149Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs Constitution Twelfth Amendment 
Bill, final mandates (2005). 
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Gauteng Legislature failed to comply with provision section 118 of the Constitution, due to a 
lack of public consultation in the process leading up to adoption of the Twelfth Constitutional 
Amendment Bill.150 The majority judgment written by Van der Westhuizen J, found that 
Gauteng complied with section 118 (1)(a) of the Constitution. However, KZN failed in its 
obligation to facilitate public consultation. Thus the part of the TwelfthConstitutional 
amendment which transferred Matatiele from KZN to Eastern Cape was declared 
unconstitutional.151 
The ThirteenthConstitutional Amendment Bill came as a result of constitutional challenges 
against the TwelfthConstitutional Amendment Bill [B33-2005] and Related Cross Boundaries 
Municipalities Act no 69 of 2000. The court had found procedural irregularities, and had 
given an order of invalidity in respect of the Matatiele areas, but had suspended that order for 
eighteen months to allow Parliament time to rectify the defect.152 The select committee on 
security and Constitutional Affairs adopted the bill without amendments. 
 
The Constitution’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment Bills were processed at the same 
time, because these bills sought to abolish floor crossing. The Fourteenth Constitutional 
Amendment abolished floor crossing in the national and provincial legislatures whilst the 
Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment abolished floor crossing at municipal councils. These 
bills followed two different processes. The Fourteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill was 
                                                           
150Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others. 2008 (10) BCLR 968 (CC) 
151MerafongDemarcation Forum and Others para 21. 
152Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs Briefing on the by Departments of 
Justice and Provincial and local government(2007). 
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referred to the provinces for further consultation, whilst the Fifteenth Constitutional 
Amendment was adopted by the NCOP without provincial input.153 
 
The Sixteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill dealt with re-demarcation of Gauteng and 
North West province.154 This amendment sought to address concerns from the Twelfth 
Constitutional Amendments, by re-demarcating the Merafong City Local Municipality back 
to Gauteng.  Due to the fact this affected the provinces and local government, it was 
necessary for this bill to be approved by the NCOP.155  Regarding the mandates considered 
by the NCOP special focus was directed at those provinces that would be directly affected by 
the changes proposed through this constitutional amendment. The committee adopted the bill 
without amendments although had reservations or issues to be taken into account when 
implementing certain provisions of the bill.156 
4.3 Ordinary bills not affecting provinces 
Although there were more Section 75 bills processed, the NCOP proposed only a few 
amendments. All the section75 bills were scrutinised and amendments proposed by the 
NCOP were counted and the quality of amendments was also assessed. A comparison was 
made between the NA and NCOP on the number of proposed amendments to section 75 bills 
as reflected in Figure5 . 
The NCOP does not put much effort when considering section 75 bills, compared to when 
dealing with Section 76 bills due to limited authority. This may be due to the delaying 
function it has regarding Section 75 bills where its proposed amendments can be easily 
                                                           
153Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs Briefing on the fourteenth and 
fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Bills (2008). 
154Constitution Sixteenth Amendment Bill [B1-2009] 
155S 74 (3)(b)(ii) Constitution 
156Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs Briefing on the fourteenth and 
fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Bills (2008). 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
overridden by the NA.157The NCOP pays less attention to these bills because they perceive 
these bills to have less impact on provinces.  
 
Figure 5:  NA and NCOP amendments of section 75 bills per year
 
Source: Parliament Document Section, 2004-2009. 
 
Figure 5 shows a significant increase in the introduction of ordinary bills not affecting 
provinces from 2006 to2008.The NCOP proposed few amendments tosection75 bills, except 
in 2004 when there were no proposed amendments. The NCOP’s proposed amendments were 
significantly lower and comprised three to four pieces of legislation a year.  Figure 6 reflects 
proposed amendments to bills not affecting provinces in percentages. 
 
Figure 6:  Amendments to section 75 bills 
                                                           
157The Ministry and Department of Provincial and Local Government (1999) 91. 
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Source: Parliament Document Archives, 2004-2009 
 
The NCOP amended only six percent of the section 75 bills, which is very small compared to 
the number of amendments effected by the NA. The types of amendments instituted by the 
portfolio committees in the NA were largely technical, grammatical and some were 
substantial. The NA made substantial amendments to the legislation largely due to the 
stakeholder inputs from public hearings that contributed to the committee’s instituting the 
correct type of amendments. Furthermore, submissions highlighted issues that would result in 
the committee’s proposing amendments that would have significant impact on the legislation. 
 
In few cases the NCOP would propose amendments at the request of the department 
sponsoring the bill, because they forgot to insert certain provisions when the bill was 
introduced in the NA.158The proposed amendments to the bills were either grammatical or 
technical; however they did not propose policy changes that would enhance the impact of the 
amendment. The NCOP proposed substantive and grammatical amendments to the 
Broadcasting Amendment Bill that was introduced in the NA. The substantive amendments 
included the composition of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) board 
members in terms of numbers required in order to form a quorum. On the substantive 
                                                           
158Corporate Laws Amendment Bill [B5D-2006]. 
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amendment the NCOP removed clauses that included the frequency of planning because this 
was not a function of the broadcaster.159The NCOP further proposed the criteria or conditions 
under which the NA may dissolve the SABC board.160 
 
The NA in most cases accepted the NCOP’s amendments to bills, irrespective of the 
grammatical, technical or substantive nature of these amendments. The NA usually accepted 
the NCOP’s proposed amendment but in few circumstances the NA rejected some of the 
NCOP’s proposed amendments.  An example of a bill where the NA rejected the NCOP’s 
proposed amendments was the Liquor Products Amendment Bill. The NCOP wanted to 
change the current practice where the minister notifies Parliament of board members, to one 
where the minister should consult Parliament before appointing board members. The NA felt 
that this would delay the appointment of board members hence they rejected this proposed 
amendment by the NCOP. 161  The NA passed the bill without the NCOP’s proposed 
amendments.  
 
The NCOP discovered a typographical error when considering the National Ports Authority 
Bill [B5D-2003] and thus the section on the nature of action intended was removed as it did 
not appear in the initial draft bill.162 The removal of this clause was a technical amendment as 
it had certain implications on the application of the bill. This clearly shows that the NCOP is 
a second eye for verifying and checking the accuracy of contents of a bill, and has a quality 
control type of function. The NCOP thus acts as a good quality control mechanism for 
                                                           
159Portfolio committee on Communications Consideration of NCOP proposed amendments to 
the Broadcasters Amendment Bill (2008).  
160Broadcasting Amendment Bill [B72A-2008], clause 4 (3). 
161Portfolio Committee on Agriculture Provision of Land & Assistance Amendment Bill: 
deliberations; Liquor Products Amendment Bill: Rejection of NCOP amendment (2008). 
162Select Committee on Public Service (2005). 
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legislation processed by Parliament to ensure the accuracy of the legislature’s intention and 
eliminate errors in law. Furthermore, the NCOP is able to identify issues that might have 
been overlooked by the NA when considering legislation.  
 
The NCOP’s section 75 legislative role was mostly very superficial.163This has been evident 
in some instances where a select committee will consider two bills at a time by obtaining a 
briefing and adopting the bill on the same day.164 The Select Committee on Environment and 
Land Affairs was briefed on the Agricultural Debt Management Repeal Bill [B24-2008] and 
adopted it on the same day without amendments. Additionally, the select committee was 
briefed on the Liquor Products Amendment Bill [B22b-2008] which incorporated the NA 
amendments. The committee also adopted the bill although with reservations regarding what 
the definition included when it referred to sorghum beer.165 
 
The NCOP operates with 54 fulltime permanent delegates. The special delegates perform a 
minimal role when they attend the NCOP sittings on special matters that would affect their 
delegates’ performance area.  The permanent delegates served on up to eight committees at a 
time compared to the NA where a member served on only two committees.166 Furthermore, 
the select committees are clustered in such a way that they carry out the load of four portfolio 
committees which are combined into one committee. For example, the select committee on 
social services would oversee the departments of health, social development and home 
affairs, whereas the NA committees oversee one department. Thus, members of the NCOP 
                                                           
163The Ministry and Department of Provincial and Local Government (1999) 94. 
164Select Committee on Land and Environmental Affairs Briefing and Adoption of the 
Agricultural Debt Management Repeal Bill and Liquor Products Amendment Bill (2008). 
165Select Committee on Land and Environmental Affairs (2008). 
166The Ministry and Department of Provincial and Local Government (1999) 95. 
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had high workloads due to the limited numbers of permanent delegates available to carry out 
its mandate effectively.  
4.4 Ordinary bills not affecting provinces 
The NCOP has more authority over ordinary bills affecting provinces, through the section 76 
bills process.167 Thus the consideration and passing of this type of legislation is viewed as the 
NCOP’s pre-eminent role. 168  The NCOP further plays an important role with regard to 
provincial budgets because provinces have little power to raise their own revenues but are 
entitled to an equitable share of revenue raised nationally.169 This equitable share is allocated 
by the Division of Revenue Bill (DRB) from the national pool of funds, which is distributed 
to all three spheres of government with the provincial share divided amongst the nine 
provinces. 170 
 
The DRB is approved by the NCOP. Provincial obligations are usually imposed through 
national legislation and thus the DRB should ensure that provinces have enough resources to 
fulfill their obligations and this bill follows the section 76 procedure that would ensure that 
the provinces have a clear voice.171 Although the DRB is a money bill in nature it follows the 
section 76 process to provide provinces with an opportunity to give meaningful input in the 
form of provincial mandates, because it affects equitable share that will be distributed 
amongst provinces. The DRBs processed by the Third Parliament have also been included in 
the analysis of section 76 bills. Similarly the financial management Act of Parliament is also 
a section76 bill even though it regulates the financial matters of Parliament.  
                                                           
167S 76 Constitution. 
168The Ministry and Department of Provincial and Local Government (1999) 91. 
169S221 (7) Constitution. 
170Murray C & Nijnzk L (2002) 43. 
171Murray C & Nijnzk L (2002) 44. 
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 Figure 7 provides a picture of ordinary bills affecting provinces as processed by the Third 
Parliament. The figure differentiates between those ordinary bills affecting provinces that 
were introduced in the NA and those introduced in the NCOP.   
 
Figure 7:  House for introducing Section 76 bills 
 
Source:  Parliament Document Archives 
Parliament received a total of 38 ordinary bills affecting provinces during the Third 
Parliament. As was indicated earlier this number of bills is significantly lower than Section 
75 bills. As depicted in the graph above there are three times more ordinary bills affecting 
provinces introduced in the NA than in the NCOP.  
 
Although section 76 bills affect provinces, only nine of these bills were introduced in the 
NCOP during the period under review. This trend displays reluctance by the executive to 
introduce bills affecting provinces in the NCOP. This was due to the stringent process of 
passing a section 76 bill affecting provinces if there are clashes between the NA’s and 
NCOP’s proposed amendments. Section 76 bills introduced in the NCOP provide more 
authority to the provinces in representing their views.  If the NA had already approved 
asection76 bill, politically it is more difficult for the NCOP with the third team of politicians’ 
representatives to adjust amendments made by the NA.  
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Figure 8:  Amendments to section 76 bills introduced in the NA
Source: Parliament Document Archives
The graph above shows a picture of ordinary bills affecting provinces as introduced in the 
NA, section 76 (1) bills with proposed amendments by the NA and NCOP. The number of 
proposed amendments by the NCOP
proposed amendments made by the NA.
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mandates before passing these bills. The number of amendments made by the NCOP is 
similar to the number instituted by the NA, yet in the section 75 bills the NCOP proposed far 
fewer amendments and there was a huge difference between the NA and NCOP in the 
number of proposed amendments.  
 
The NCOP had made two substantive amendments to the Foodstuffs Cosmetics and 
Disinfectants Amendment Bill [B35-2005] which the NA accepted, however there were 
conflicting views on the definition to be used for ‘mollusc’. The NCOP wanted the definition 
to be expanded so that it provides an explanation of what it meant.  However the opposing 
view was that in law if examples are provided anything outside the examples is excluded.174 
 
The NA rejected the NCOP’s proposed amendment and the bill was sent to a mediation 
committee upon which it provided an alternative proposal which became the final 
amendment. As articulated in the Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) Audit Report, there was 
a general perspective that some of the reasons for few clashes or bills referred to the 
mediation committee are as a result of the political context of this country in that, the ruling 
party has the same political majority in both houses. Furthermore, it was observed that had 
there been more political diversity in provinces then there would be real debate occurring in 
the NCOP.175 
 
Practice from the First Parliament has shown that only in exceptional cases have ordinary 
bills affecting provinces been introduced in the NCOP, whilst most bills affecting provinces 
                                                           
174
 Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Amendment Bill [B35 – 2005]. 
175The Ministry and Department of Provincial and Local Government (1999)101. 
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are introduced in the NA. Upon further enquiry during the First Parliament, it was noted that 
an MP had indicated that the debate should be held in the NA which is viewed as the senior 
house.176A national minister (quoted anonymously) indicated a preference for introducing 
section76 bills in the NA because once the NA agrees on the bill, the NCOP is under pressure 
to pass the bill. Furthermore, there is more control from the minister when interacting with 
the NA as, unlike the provinces, they meet regularly, and thus can have more influence on the 
process. Furthermore, there is an opportunity to fast track the bill through the legislative 
process if it is introduced in the NA.177 
 
During the period under review, a similar trend existed where few section 76 bills were 
introduced in the NCOP. It is possible that similar reasons exist for the introduction of more 
section 76 bills in the NA, but none of that confirmation was obtained. Figure 9 compares the 
number of bills introduced in the NCOP and amendments proposed by the two houses.  
 
Figure 9:  Amendments to bills introduced in the NCOP 
 
Source: Parliament archives 2004-2009 
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There has been a significantly lower number of section 76 bills introduced in the NCOP as 
opposed to those introduced in the NA. The NCOP has instituted amendments to all section 
76 bills introduced in the NCOP. The amendments made by the NCOP were largely 
grammatical.  However in some bills there were both technical and substantive amendments. 
An example is the proposed amendments to the Prevention of and Treatment for Substance 
Abuse Bill [B12C-2008].The amendments required the removal of persons providing 
community based care services, and the registration of mental health practitioners providing 
community based care services. This ensured that a professional person would perform the 
duties instead of ordinary person.  During the Third Parliament only two bills were referred to 
the mediation committee.178 
 
Two bills affecting provinces that were introduced in the NCOP were previously declared 
invalid by the Constitutional Court due to insufficient consultation. The bills were the Choice 
of Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill and the Traditional Health Practitioners’ Bill. 
The reason these bills were introduced in the NCOP was because of the impact they have on 
provinces and the process would ensure greater public participation by the provinces. When 
dealing with these bills the NCOP first had preliminary negotiating mandates, final 
negotiating mandates and then final mandates.179So this clearly shows that the process was 
more vigorous. Bills introduced in the NCOP provide a substantial chance for the provinces 
to influence national legislation.180 
 
                                                           
178Foodstuffs, cosmetics [B35-2005] and children’s amendment bill [B19-2006] 
179Select Committee on Social Services Choice of termination of pregnancy and traditional 
health practitioners’ bill: preliminary negotiating mandates (2007).  
180Bosire C ‘Evaluation and Impact on the National Council of provinces’ (2010).  
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Generally the NCOP and NA agreed on proposed amendments and only two bills were 
referred to the mediation committee. The NCOP proposed amendments to the Prevention of 
and Treatment for substance abuse bill [B12C-2008]. The bill had grammatical errors such as 
changing ‘state organ’ to ‘organ of state’. Other amendments were technical in that they 
required the removal of persons providing community based care services replaced by the 
registration of mental health practitioners providing community based care services.181 The 
NA accepted the NCOP amendments.182 
 
The number of section 76 bills that are introduced in the NCOP is too small to differentiate 
the quality of the NCOP’s proposed amendments from those section76 bills introduced in the 
NA. The issue is not whether or not the NCOP proposes different types of amendments 
because both types of bills affect provinces. The concern is whether the NCOP’s proposed 
amendments are agreed upon by the NA and eventually incorporated into law. None of the 
section 76 bills introduced in the NCOP lapsed because of disagreements by the mediation 
committee.   
4.5 Amending mixed bills 
Amongst the bills processed by the Third Parliament there were also mixed bills. The mixed 
bills comprised a significantly low number of only two bills.  An example of a mixed bill 
considered by Parliament was the Tobacco Products Control Amendment Bill [B24-2006]. 
This bill was classified as a mixed bill because it had both section 75 and section76 elements. 
The state law advisor indicated that the section 75 part would have to be processed before 
                                                           
181Prevention of and Treatment for substance abuse bill [B12C-2008] Clause 16 
182Portfolio Committee on Social Development Prevention of & Treatment for Substance 
Abuse Bill: NCOP amendments (2008). 
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considering the section 76elements of the bill. The bill was then split and new public hearings 
were held to consider the bill thus re-starting the consultation process.183 
 
Another example of a mixed bill was the Children’s Bill that was re-introduced in the Third 
Parliament and would be split. The splitting of mixed bills occurs when a bill is divided into 
two bills: those affecting provinces and those not affecting provinces. Parliament dealt with 
asection75 aspect of the bill which comprised of national competencies that focus on 
children’s rights and later considered section 76 elements that had provincial competence. 
The reason for the delay was that the correct procedures had to be followed for each section 
of the bill.  When both sections of the bill were adopted, they would be reconciled into one.184 
The children’s bill section not affecting provinces was passed in 2005, while the second 
section of the bill, namely children’s amendment bill which affected provinces was passed in 
2007.  
4.6 Amending money bills 
The NCOP when considering money bills uses the procedure set out in section 75 where 
members vote individually and not per province. Similarly in the select committee’s 
proceedings they adopt a similar practice to that when considering ordinary bills not affecting 
provinces that is, obtain briefings and adopt on the same day. However there are instances 
where they would require input from National Treasury or some other relevant financial 
institution to provide perspective on the money bills under consideration. There have been 
quite a substantial number of money bills considered by the Third Parliament as portrayed in 
Figure 10.  
                                                           
183Portfolio Committee on Health, Foodstuffs, Cosmetics & Disinfectants Amendment Bill 
(B35D-2005): Consideration of NCOP Amendments (2006). 
184Portfolio Committee on Social Development Children’s Bill: Departmental Briefing 
(2004). 
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Figure 10:  Amendments proposed to money bills 
 
Source: Parliament Document Archives 2004-2009 
 
Parliament has had few proposed amendments to the money bills through the NA. The 
Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Act 9 of 2009 came into force only on 16 
April 2009, just before the end of the Third Parliament.  
4.7 Bills not passed 
Figure 11 below shows all the bills that were not passed by the Third Parliament, either 
because they were withdrawn or they lapsed. There were 11 bills that lapsed during the Third 
Parliament amounting to 4.7 percent. In addition, there were eight 
bills that were withdrawn resulting in 3.5 percent of the entire bills being processed in the 
Third Parliament.  
Figure 11:  Bills not passed 
 
Source: Parliament Document Archives 2004-2009 
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Various processes are followed when different types of bills lapse. Usually bills will lapse if 
the mediation committee is unable to agree on a version of the bill within 30 days of the bill 
being referred to it, or rejected by the council in the case of section 76 bills introduced in the 
NCOP. 185  The figure above shows a significantly low number of bills that lapsed compared 
to bills that have been passed by Parliament.  
 
There were only eight bills that were withdrawn by the executive during the third term of 
Parliament, constituting about 3.5 percent of the bills introduced. Withdrawal of bills had 
occurred at the portfolio committee level of interaction during the Third Parliament mainly 
due to the department’s lack of consultative process.  
 
Bills not passed continue to the next parliamentary session, although previous experience has 
shown that some of them eventually get withdrawn by the respective department. Examples 
of bills that were carried through two parliamentary terms and later withdrawn are the 
Judicial Officers Amendment bill [B1-2001] and the Superior Courts Bill [B52-2003].The 
reason for the delay with these bills was to ensure that further consultation could take 
place.186 
4.8 Quality of the NCOP’s amendments 
The amendments proposed by the NCOP were both technical and grammatical. Regarding 
ordinary bills not affecting provinces the NCOP usually functions as a review house that 
provides an opportunity to affect further amendments overlooked by the NA. The proposals 
                                                           
185Rule 190, Joint Rules of Parliament 
186Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development deliberating on the 
Superior Courts Bill (2003). 
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would normally be influenced by the respective department or relevant stakeholders and do 
not represent the views of provinces. 
 
Amendments made to bills affecting the Constitution were low in number although great care 
was taken on constitutional amendments that affected provinces. The NCOP would not 
deliberate on bills amending the Constitution unless the interested provinces submitted 
mandates or agreed on the bill. In addition, the NCOP instituted numerous amendments to 
bills affecting provinces and facilitated provincial consultative processes.  The NCOP 
proposed mainly substantial amendments to these types of bills and guarded against cost 
implications for the provinces in implementing such legislation. The NCOP also instituted 
technical and grammatical amendments. The quality of amendments introduced to legislation 
affecting provinces is greater and more substantial than those instituted on ordinary bills not 
affecting provinces.  
 
Assessing the quality of amendments affected by the NCOP against its constitutional mandate 
of representing the provinces proved to be challenge, because there is no definition or 
guideline of what constitutes provincial interests. Similarly, what might be of interest in the 
Eastern Cape, as an example, might not necessarily be of interest in Gauteng. Therefore a 
provincial interest does not have to be something applicable to all the provinces all the time. 
It is thus difficult to assess the legislative impact of the NCOP against the obligation of 
representing the interests of the provinces.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
The NCOP has demonstrated greater participation when considering legislation affecting 
provinces as opposed to section 75 bills. This is due to the amount of proposed amendments 
and possibly the realisation that the legislation affects the provinces directly. There were 
more section 76 bills introduced in the NA than those introduced in the NCOP. It would be 
important to consider which criteria are used when ordinary bills affecting provinces should 
be introduced in the NA and when they should be introduced in the NCOP.  
 
The NCOP has made substantial and grammatical amendments to legislation it has processed. 
However, it considered section 75 bills at a superficial level, whereby the committee would 
be briefed, consider and adopt that particular legislation on the same day. The NCOP sees 
itself playing a less significant role on section 75 bills because they do not affect the 
provinces. A thorough process is followed and accommodated in the NCOP four week 
programme when it considers bills affecting provinces and ensures there is a process of 
briefing and receiving submissions from provincial legislatures to guarantee that the interests 
of the provinces are taken into consideration.  
 
The 2008 Parliament independent assessment report identified weaknesses in the 
parliamentary legal services for the non-initiation of legislation by both the NA and the 
NCOP.187 In addition the NA has a large number of portfolio committees and members and 
thus more capacity to deal with legislation proposed by the departments. During the Third 
Parliament, the NA initiated an own bill, the Parliament financial management bill, which 
regulates how Parliament’s funds should be used and reported on. This number is still low 
                                                           
187Parliament of RSA Report of the independent panel assessment of Parliament (2008). 
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and Parliament should work at initiating its own pieces of legislation. The NCOP has not yet 
initiated any bills. It would be useful to conduct more research that would provide more 
information on what exactly provincial interests mean.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Some public figures, such as the former Minister of Cooperative Government Sicelo Shiceka, 
claimed that the NCOP was an irrelevant institution,188 whilst the independent assessment 
report of Parliament indicated that the NCOP failed to fulfill its constitutional 
mandate. 189 Former President Thabo Mbeki was amongst those who acknowledged the 
challenges in the composition of the NCOP and noted that it lacked strategic focus in its 
operation as a result of deep and complex challenges.190More recently, the Chairperson of the 
NCOP acknowledged the good work by the NCOP by recognising its impact and relevance in 
the national legislative processes.191 
 
Prompted by such claims and counterclaims, this paper sought to examine the relevance of 
the NCOP in the national legislative processes. Were the claims questioning the relevance of 
the NCOP well founded? The questions the paper sought to answer concern the role and 
impact of the NCOP in the national legislative process; whether or not the NCOP adds any 
value, and if it has fulfilled its constitutional mandate to represent the interests of the 
provinces. The paper focused on bills processed by the Third Parliament. This chapter 
highlights the findings of the study by summarising the preceding chapters, focusing on the 
critical and important aspects that answer the question set out at the beginning of this paper. 
Some recommendations are also made that would assist in addressing some of the major 
findings from this paper.  
                                                           
188Legal Brief Today (2010). 
189Parliament of RSA (2008). 
190Mbeki T (1998). 
191Mahlangu J (2013). 
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2. SUMMARY OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTERS 
The second chapter discussed the formation of the NCOP and the reason for its 
establishment.  The chapter provided a description of the role, function and the legal 
framework of the NCOP. The NCOP predominantly functions with 54 permanent delegates 
although in special cases it receives support from special delegates and non-voting local 
government representatives. The number of members who carry out the functions of the 
NCOP is limited, which means that the NCOP needs use its resources effectively. 
 
It was pointed out that the caliber of the delegates of the NCOP had a negative impact on the 
effective achievement of its constitutional mandate. 192  The delegates of the NCOP are 
politically weaker than their counterparts in the NA or the provincial legislatures and 
therefore they carry less authority. This is evident when disagreements arise between the NA 
and the NCOP’s proposed amendments, where the NA may reject the NCOP’s amendments 
with a special majority. Furthermore, the NCOP delegates may be recalled by the party that 
nominated them in the province should the provincial legislature lose confidence in its 
delegated members. 193 
 
The third chapter described the legislative processes and the different types of bills as guided 
by the Constitution. There are three legislative processes followed when processing bills and 
these follow procedures outlined in section 74, section 75 and section 76 of the Constitution. 
The NCOP plays different roles on bills amending the Constitution depending on the type of 
                                                           
192Murray C & Nijzink L (2001) 57. 
193Budlender S (1996) 17-3. 
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constitutional provisions to be amended. The NCOP has veto power on certain constitutional 
amendments to section 1 of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, provincial matters or matters 
directly affecting the NCOP. Furthermore, the NCOP does not expressly regulate this process 
of the veto power by the NCOP.194 When voting on these constitutional amendments the 
NCOP requires a minimum of six provinces voting in favour of the proposed amendments.195 
Furthermore, there are no mediation procedures available on bills amending the Constitution. 
These voting requirements are similar to those of ordinary bills affecting provinces.  
 
The ordinary bills not affecting provinces follow the section 75 procedure outlined in the 
Constitution. The NCOP may pass, reject or propose amendments to these bills that are 
introduced in the NA. The process is fairly simple when the NCOP does not propose 
amendments or the NA accepts the NCOP’s proposed amendments to these bills, as they will 
be sent to the president to be signed into law.196 If the NCOP rejects the bill or the NA 
disagrees with the NCOP’s proposed amendments, then the bill would be referred to the NA 
which will decide whether or not to accept or reject the NCOP’s proposed amendments or 
pass the NA’s original version of the bill.197 When voting on a section 75 bill, each delegate 
of the NCOP casts an individual vote.  
 
Ordinary bills affecting provinces may be introduced either in the NA or in the NCOP and 
they follow the procedure outlined in section 76 of the Constitution. There are no guidelines 
on when section 76 bills should be introduced in the NA or the NCOP, thus it is at the 
discretion of the executive authority.  Furthermore, there are no differences in the 
                                                           
194Budlender S (1996) 17-10. 
195S 74 Constitution.  
196S 75 Constitution.  
197S 75 (1) (c) Constitution. 
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consultative process in the provinces when these bills are introduced in the different houses. 
However, the difference is noted in the veto power of the NCOP which is more evident in 
section 76 bills introduced in the NCOP.  
 
If the NA and NCOP disagree on a version of a section 76 bill introduced in the NA and after 
consultation with the mediation committee the NCOP still disagrees, then the either the bill 
will be passed by a two-thirds majority of the NA or it will lapse.198 However, a section 76 
bill introduced in the NCOP, where these two houses disagree on proposed amendments and 
after consultation with the mediation committee the NA rejects with the NCOP’s proposed 
amendments, then the bill would lapse.199 Thus the NCOP has more authority regarding 
section 76 bills introduced in the NCOP should there be disagreements with the NA. The 
NCOP requires provincial mandates when proposing amendments to section 76 bills and 
must vote with a minimum of six provinces in support of the proposed amendments.200 
 
Apart from the assessment of the different legislative processes followed by the NCOP when 
processing different types of bills, the paper discussed the tagging process which classifies 
bills in parliament. Tagging is a process that determines the procedure to be followed by a 
particular bill in the parliamentary processes which impacts on the extent of involvement by 
the provinces. The different legislative processes followed when considering the different 
types of bills were outlined. Focus was on the role of the NCOP which differs when 
considering the different types of bills in terms of how it deliberates on the different bills, the 
                                                           
198S 76 (1) (i) Constitution.  
199S 76 (2) (i) Constitution.  
200S 65 Constitution. 
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consultative process, incorporation of proposed amendments and voting requirements when 
passing the different types of bills.   
3. FINDINGS 
The main findings of this thesis are summarized below. 
Bills amending the constitution comprised two percent of all bills processed by the Third 
Parliament amounting to an average of one bill processed per year. The NCOP played a role 
in all the section 74 bills processed even though the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill 
did not require provincial input but was finalised at committee level. The NCOP proposed 
amendments to all the bills amending the constitution that required its input. The nature of 
these bills directly affected various provinces and thus required input by those affected 
provinces. Most of the section 74 bills dealt with cross boundaries and the consultative 
process of incorporating provincial mandates was critical. There were irregularities found in 
the Twelfth Constitutional Amendment regarding the consultative process.  
 
Parliament processed more ordinary bills not affecting provinces than any other types of bills 
between 2004 and 2009. About two-thirds of section 75 bills were processed by Parliament, 
equating to 69 percent and an average of 31 bills processed each year.201 The role of the 
NCOP with regard to section 75 bills is limited and superficial. The role of the NCOP is 
limited in that provincial input is not necessarily required on these bills because the NCOP 
delegates vote as individuals.  Similarly, the NCOP plays a superficial role in section 75 bills 
because it would consider and adopt these bills on the same day. The committee would not 
have sufficient time to deliberate on a bill if it considers and adopts the bill on the same day.  
                                                           
201Figure 3. 
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Parliament had about two-thirds of section 75 bills of which the NCOP proposed the least 
amendments to compared to section 76 bills. Furthermore, where the NCOP proposed 
amendments to section 75 bills, these were not substantial but were rather grammatical 
rectifications. This may be due to the superficial manner in which the NCOP considers these 
types of bills. In certain circumstances the NCOP has played a useful role in section 76 bills 
when a second review was necessary and instituted further amendments that had been 
overlooked by the NA.  
 
There were significantly lower numbers of section 76 bills constituting 17 percent of the bills 
processed by the Third Parliament and an average of three bills a year. The NCOP has 
proposed more amendments to ordinary bills affecting provinces compared to any other bills, 
constituting 79 percent. The NCOP followed a four week cycle when considering section 76 
bills. Furthermore, the NCOP has more authority on section 76 bills and accommodates the 
interests of the provinces by requiring provincial mandates. In addition, the head of a 
provincial delegation will vote on behalf of the relevant province.202 
 
Similar to the First Parliament, there were more section 76 bills introduced in the NA than in 
the NCOP. This is due to the more stringent process for passing a section 76 bill if it is 
introduced in the NCOP.  This becomes a difficult process for the executive authority that has 
introduced the bill, hence it is easier and frequently practiced that the bill is introduced in the 
NA even though it directly affects the provinces.  
 
                                                           
202S 65 Constitution.  
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The NCOP proposed both grammatical and substantial amendments to section 76 bills. Thus, 
the NCOP has fulfilled its constitutional mandate of representing the interests of provinces in 
the national legislative process as guided by the Constitution and other legal frameworks. The 
NCOP has demonstrated its relevance and represented the interests of provinces on bills 
affecting provinces. The NCOP has played a significant role with regard to section 76 bills.  
 
The money bills accounted for 12 percent which is an average of two bills a year. Those bills 
amending the Constitution formed two percent of bills processed by Parliament, averaging 
one bill per year.203 The Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act 9 of 
2009 only came into operation 16 April 2009, almost at the end of the Third Parliament. Thus 
the NCOP could not play a role in terms of money bills.  
 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
On section 74 bills, the NCOP must carefully monitor its consultative process especially in 
representing the interests of provinces.  This will be achieved by the provincial legislature 
conducting a thorough consultation process with its citizens especially on matters of cross 
boundaries.  
 
On section 75 bills, the NCOP should determine the role it seeks to play in section 75 bills. It 
could either not consider these bills or focus its energy on assigning limited resources to 
section 76 bills. Alternatively, the NCOP could act as a review house on those section 75 bills 
that require more input on aspects that were missed during the NA process.  
                                                           
203Figure 3. 
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(i)  On section 76 bills introduced in the NCOP, the role of the NCOP should be 
strengthened by requiring the executive authority to introduce more section 76 bills 
in the NCOP.  This will grant the NCOP more authority on its proposed amendments 
and not be overridden by the NA’s special majority should there be disagreements 
between the two houses.  
 
(ii)  The electoral process of South Africa should be reviewed with a view to granting the 
delegates of the NCOP greater political power to represent its electorate. This 
change would enhance the political authority of the NCOP so that it would not fear 
being recalled by the provincial legislatures when they lack confidence in the NCOP 
or when its amendments are rejected by the NA with a special majority on bills 
affecting provinces.  
 
(iii)  The permanent delegates who carry out the daily functions of the NCOP should be 
strategically located to perform the NCOP’s core function of representing the 
interests of provinces without duplicating the work of the NA. The NCOP should re-
prioritise its work and limit its committees to focus on issues of provincial 
competence. The NCOP committees should reflect the issues of provincial 
competence and the debates in the house should be focused on provincial matters. 
This would give the NCOP an opportunity to initiate its own legislation to exercise 
the full authority vested in it by the Constitution because currently it is still the 
executive authority that brings legislation to Parliament.  
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 An in-depth analysis should be provided to shed light on the constitutional mandate 
of the NCOP of representing provincial interests. As mentioned earlier there is no 
uniform identification of what provincial interests are and thus no common 
understanding of what this implies. This is something that should be explored in 
order to provide a full assessment of whether the NCOP has indeed fulfilled its 
constitutional mandate.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
66 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books and Articles  
Battaro J and Visser P ‘Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 110 of 1983’ in 
search of History grade 12’ (1999) available 
athttp://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/constitution-republic-south-africa-act-110-1983  
(accessed 15 August 2012) 
 
Bosire C ‘Evaluation and impact of the National Council of Provinces’ (2010) available at 
www.ddp.org.za/programme-events/international.../file(accessed 15 September 2011). 
 
Boskati N Promoting Provincial Interests: the role of the NCOP in the national legislature 
(unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2005) 
 
Brandt M From the Senate to the NCOP (unpublished LLM thesis, University of 
Stellenbosch, 2001) 
 
Budlender S ‘National legislative authority’ in M Chaskalson, Marcus G & Bishop M (ed) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) Cape Town: Juta 17-1:17-42 
 
Calland R &Nijzink L ‘Intergovernmental relations in the legislative branch of government: 
The NCOP’ in Levy N & Tapscott C (ed) Intergovernmental Relations of South Africa: 
Challenges of Cooperative Government (2001) Cape Town: IDASA and School of 
Government (University of the Western Cape) Publishing 
 
Cloete J Parliaments of South Africa (2006) Pretoria: Van Schaick 
 
De Vos P ‘The Role of the National Council of Provinces in the governance of South Africa 
‘in Luther J, Passaglia P and Tarchi R (ed) A world of second chambers handbook for 
constitutional Studies on bicameralism (2006)Milan:GiuffreEditore, Centre for studies on 
Federalism Series 
 
De Vos P ‘Do not say goodbye to NCOP yet’ in Constitutionally Speaking (6 September 
2010). Available at http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/dont-say-goodbey-ncop-
yet/(accessed 30 April 2011) 
 
Inman P & Rubinfield D ‘Federalism and South Africa’s Democratic Bargain: The Zuma 
Challenge’ available atlaw.berkeley.edu (accessed 12 October 2013)  
 
Kihato C &Rapoo T ‘A future for the provinces? New rethink needed on the role of province 
‘Provincial Governance Series(23 June 2001) available 
athttp://www.cps.org.za/23.htm(accessed 15 June 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
Murray C ‘Republic of South Africa’ (2011) available at 
http://www.federalism.ch/files/categories/IntensivkursII/SouthAfricag3.pdf (accessed 15 
September 2011) 
 
Murray C &Nijzink L Building Representative democracy: South Africa’s legislatures and 
the Constitution (2002) Cape Town: Parliamentary Support Programme 
 
Murray C, Hoffman-Wanderer, Y and Saller K‘NCOP Second Term 1999-2004’ (29) in 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa: The National Council of Provinces – 
Perspectives on the First Ten Years (2008) Cape Town: University of Cape Town 
 
Murray C, Hoffman-Wanderer Y and Saller K Speeding Transformation:  Monitoring and 
Oversight in the NCOP (2004) Public Law, Cape Town: University of Cape Town 
 
Murray C & Simeone R ‘Tagging bills in Parliament section 75 or section 76’ (2006) South 
African Law Journal  
 
 
 
Official Documents
 
African National Congress (ANC) Summit on Provincial and Local Government (2-4 
December 2010) available at www.anc.org.za/docs/discus/2010/summitz.pdf(accessed 15 
May 2011) 
 
B74A amendments as agreed to by the select committee on Finance. Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa (2008) Vol.3.Third session Third: Parliament 
 
Criminal Law (Sentencing) & Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) A/B: adoption; Magistrate’s 
Remuneration; Outstanding Bills(29 November 2007) available 
athttp://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20071120-criminal-law-sentencing-criminal-law-sexual-
offences-ab-adoption-magistrate%E2%80%99s-remun (accessed 12 June 2011) 
 
Joint Task Team Report Reviewing the legislative process in Parliament(2008) available on 
www.parliament.gov.za  (accessed on 15 September 2011)  
 
Mahlangu J Address by the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, on the 
occasion of the inaugural lecture of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), University of 
the Western Cape(21 February 2013) available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/sa-mninwa-
johannes-mahlangu-address-by-the-chairperson-of-the-national-council-of-provinces-on-the-
ccasion-of-the-inaugural-lecture-of-the-national-council-of-provinces-university-of-the-
western-cape-belville-20022013-2013-02-2 (accessed 10 March 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
Mbeki T ‘Speech of Deputy President TM Mbeki at a conference on the NCOP’ (8 May 
1998) available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1998/98914 2189810682.htm (accessed 
15 September 2010) 
 
MemelaT ‘Speech by the Deputy Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces on the 
occasion of the democracy development programme 6th national annual government 
conference’ (2010) available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=1358 (accessed on 18 June 2011) 
 
Pandor N ‘Chairperson of the NCOP: Extract from a presentation at the Meeting of the 
World’s Senates’ (14 March 2000) Paris 
 
Parliament of RSA‘Oversight and Accountability Model: Asserting Parliament’s oversight 
role in enhancing democracy’ available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/content/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20OVAC%20Model%20-
%20edited%20Word%20version%20-
%20Replaced%20Diagrams,Chapter%20Upper%20case_27-Jan-09~1~1.pdf(accessed 15 
September 2011) 
 
Parliament of RSA ‘Report of the independent panel assessment of Parliament’(2008) 
available at 
www.parliament.gov.za/.../The_Panel_for_Assessment_of_Parliament_Report_Final~1.pdf, 
(accessed 15 January 2011) 
 
Portfolio Committee on Agriculture Provision of Land & Assistance Amendment Bill: 
deliberations; Liquor Products Amendment Bill: Rejection of NCOP amendment (02 
September 2008). Available at http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080902-provision-land-
assistance-amendment-bill-deliberations-liquor-product (accessed 12 June 2011) 
 
Portfolio Committee on Communications ‘Consideration of NCOP proposed amendments to 
the Broadcasters Amendment Bill’ (11 November 2008) available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20081111-broadcasting-amendment-bill-adoption-ncop-
changes-annual-report-20070 (accessed 12 June 2011) 
 
Portfolio Committee on Health ‘Foodstuffs, Cosmetics & Disinfectants Amendment Bill 
(B35D-2005): Consideration of NCOP Amendments’(07 November 2006) available 
athttp://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20061106-foodstuffs-cosmetics-disinfectants-amendment-
bill-b35d-2005-consideration-ncop-amen (accessed 12 June 2011) 
 
Portfolio Committee on Housing ‘Prevention of Illegal Eviction from & Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Amendment Bill (PIE Bill): rejection’ (06 August 2008) available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080806-discussion-formal-decision-be-taken-and-report-be-
tabled-prevention-i (accessed 12 June 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Deliberating on the 
Superior Courts Bill’ (14 November 2003) available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20031113-superior-courts-bill-deliberations (accessed 12 
June 2011) 
 
Portfolio Committee on Social Development ‘Children’s Bill: Departmental Briefing’ (04 
August 2004) available athttp://www.pmg.org.za/report/20040804-children%E2%80%99s-
bill-department-briefing (accessed 12 June 2011) 
 
Portfolio Committee on Social Development ‘Prevention of & Treatment for Substance 
Abuse Bill: NCOP amendments’ (18 November 2008) available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20081118-prevention-treatment-substance-abuse-bill-ncop-
amendments (accessed 12 June 2011)  
 
Portfolio Committee on Transport ‘National Ports Authority Bill Adoption’ (18 November 
2004)available at http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20041117-national-ports-authority-bill-
adoption (accessed 12 June 2011) 
 
Select Committee on Social Services ‘Choice of termination of pregnancy and traditional 
health practitioners bill: preliminary negotiating mandates, select committee on social 
services’(05 September 2007) available at http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20070904-choice-
termination-pregnancy-ab-traditional-health-practitioners-bill-preliminary-n(accessed 12 June 
2011) 
 
Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs ‘Constitution Twelfth Amendment 
Bill, final mandates’ (12 December 2005) available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20051211-constitution-twelfth-amendment-bill-final-
mandates-suspension-magistrates (accessed 12 June 2011) 
 
Select Committee on Land and Environmental Affairs ‘Briefing and Adoption of the 
Agricultural Debt Management Repeal Bill and Liquor Products Amendment Bill’(07 August 
2008) available at http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080807-briefing-doa-possible-
finalisation-agricultural-debt-management-repeal (accessed 12 June 2011) 
 
Select Committee on Public Service ‘National Ports Authority bill deliberation and 
adoption’(25 May 2005) available at http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20050524-national-
ports-bill-deliberation-and-adoption (accessed 12 June 2011) 
 
Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs ‘Briefing on the 13th Amendment 
Bill by Departments of Justice and Provincial and local government’ (09 October 2007) 
available at http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20071008-constitution-13th-amendment-bill-
briefings-departments-justice-provincial-local-gov (accessed 12 June 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs ‘Briefing on the Fourteenth 
Constitutional Amendment’ (26 August 2008) available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080826-floor-crossing-legislation-department-briefing-
constitution-14th-law- (accessed 12 June 2011) 
 
The Department and Ministry of Provincial and Local Government ‘Intergovernmental 
relations in the legislative branch of government: The role and function of the NCOP’ (1999) 
available at www.cogta.gov.za/subwebsites/idpmanual/audit4.pdf (accessed 15 September 
2012) 
 
Joint rules of Parliament (2008) Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 
 
Rules of the National Assembly 6th Edition November (2008) Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa  
 
Rules of the NCOP Parliament of the Republic of South Africa  
 
 
 
NEWS ARTICLES  
Legal brief Today ‘Shiceka questions relevance of the NCOP’ (6 September 2010) available 
at www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=20100906091713237 (accessed 15 March 2011) 
Motlante K ‘Deputy President Address at the NCOP strategic planning workshop’ (13 August 
2009) available at http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/address-deputy-president-kgalema-
motlanthe-national-council-provinces-strategic (accessed 18 September 2011) 
 
Zille H‘Scrapping the provinces a bad idea’ (10 July 2009)available at 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=135898&sn=
Detail (accessed 15 May 2011) 
 
STATUTES 
Children’s Amendment bill [B19-2006] 
Communal Land Rights Act 11 of (2004) 
Constitution sixteenth amendment bill [B1-2009] 
Corporate Laws Amendment Bill[B5D-2006] 
Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Amendment bill [B35 – 2005] 
Mandating Procedures Act 52 of (2008)  
Prevention of and Treatment for substance abuse bill [B12C-2008] 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of (1996) 
Determination of Delegates (NCOP) Act 69 of (1998) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
71 
 
 
CASE LAW 
Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC). 
 
Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the amended text 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 1997 (2) SA 97(CC) 
 
Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 
2000 (1) SA 732 BCLR. 
 
Stephen Segopotso Tongoane and Others vs. Minister of Agriculture, Land Affairs and 
Others (2010) (8) BCLR 741 (CC). 
 
 
 
 
 
